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LEGAL REVOLUTIONS: SIX MISTAKES 
ABOUT DISCONTINUITY IN THE LEGAL 
ORDER 
MICHAEL STEVEN GREEN• 
A legal revolution occurs when chains of legal dependence rupture 
-causing one legal system to be replaced by a different and 
incommensurable legal system. For example, before the French 
Revolution chains of legal dependence ultimately led to Louis XVI, 
but after this legal revolution they led to the National Assembly (or 
the people of France it represented). 
The very possibility of legal revolutions depends upon laws being 
structured into legal systems in this fashion. And yet, despite 
substantial academic interest in legal revolutions, there has been a 
reluctance to examine the structure that makes them possible. The 
goal of this Article is to begin to fill this gap by examining six 
mistakes in reasoning about legal revolutions that occur when the 
structure of legal systems is ignored. My discussion focuses on 
concrete examples of these mistakes, drawn from a wide variety of 
sources, including the writings of Akhil Amar, the Supreme Court 
of Pakistan's 1958 decision in State v. Dosso, the jurisprudence of 
John Austin, and recent criticisms ofBush v. Gore. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1788, a financial crisis forced Louis XVI to summon the 
Estates-General, a representative body with no tradition of vested 
powers.1 On June 17, 1789, the Third Estate, which consisted of 
commoners, withdrew from the Estates-General and renamed itself 
the National Assembly.2 Three days later, in the Tennis Court Oath, 
it announced its intention to promulgate a constitution for France.3 
Popular support for the Assembly increased, and on June 27 the King 
recognized it.4 
Was this a legal revolution-a break in the continuity of the legal 
1. 1 GEORGES LEFEBVRE, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION: FROM ITS ORIGINS TO 
1793, at 97-102 (Elizabeth Moss Evanson trans., 1962). 
2. /d. at 112. 
3. See id. at 112-13. 
4. /d. at 114. 
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order? Was one legal system replaced by another through extra-legal 
means? Before June, 1789, Louis XVI's authority was absolute: all 
valid laws could be traced back to his command. But it is unclear that 
the events in June changed that fact. It was commonly thought, by 
members of the National Assembly as well as others, that the new 
constitution would be valid only if given royal approvaJ.5 The 
National Assembly, like the Estates-General that preceded it, 
apparently had power only because the King said it did. 
But by the time the National Assembly announced its 
Declaration of the Rights of Man on August 4--after the storming of 
the Bastille on July 14--a legal revolution had occurred. The 
authority of the National Assembly no longer depended upon the 
royal will.6 Although the King accepted the Declaration as legally 
valid, its legal validity did not depend upon his recognition.7 His 
recognition merely acknowledged an established legal fact. 
This Article is about legal revolutions. I use the term "legal 
revolutions" to distinguish them from what can be called "political 
revolutions," that is, revolutions that are primarily about dramatic 
political, social and economic changes. Although both a legal and a 
political revolution occurred in 1789, the two need not always 
coincide. If Article V procedures were used to pass an amendment to 
the United States Constitution that prohibited private property, only 
a political, not a legal, revolution would have occurred. Conversely, 
although the United States Constitution was probably illegal from the 
perspective of the Articles of Confederation (because the procedures 
for amending the Articles were ignored when the Constitution was 
ratified),8 its ratification was probably only a legal, not a political, 
revolution. The political, social and economic changes in 1787 were 
minor.9 
5. !d. at 112. 
6. !d. at 130-31. 
7. !d. at 133. 
8. E.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 168 (1991) (noting 
that "patriots" at the Constitutional Convention claimed authority, in the name of the 
people, to ignore the rules that the Articles of Confederation specified to govern their own 
revision); Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 475, 476-77 (1995) (noting that the reformers to the Constitution did not play by the 
established rules for amendment but tried to compensate for their legal deficiencies 
through a remarkable bootstrapping process). 
9. For example, there was no political resistance to the new "illegal" Constitution. 
Andrew Arato, Forms of Constitution Making and Theories of Democracy, 17 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 191, 214 n. 45 (1995). For a description of the political continuity between the two 
legal systems, see Calvin H. Johnson, Homage to Clio: The Historical Continuity from the 
Articles of Confederation into the Constitution, 20 CONST. COMM. 463,475-77 (2004). 
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Legal revolutions are a favored theme in the legal academy.10 A 
recent example is the charge that Bush v. Gore11 was a "judicial 
coup."12 At the very least, this means that the Supreme Court's 
10. See generally BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE 
STRUCfURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998) (explaining the constitutional 
revolution of the "New Deal" Court under the Roosevelt administration); Guyora Binder, 
What's Left?, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1985 (1991) (arguing that revolutionary movements are an 
important type of social setting for the construction and articulation of political values); 
J.M. Eekelaar, Principles of Revolutionary Legality, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN 
JURISPRUDENCE 22 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1973) (exploring the role of the judiciary in 
preserving pre-existing legal norms leading up to and following a revolution); J.M. Finnis, 
Revolutions and Continuity of Law, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 44 (A.W.B. 
Simpson ed., 1973) (criticizing Hans Kelsen's theory of legal discontinuity, which defines a 
revolution as any illegal change in a nation's constitution, as arbitrary and ambiguous); 
Charles Fried, Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13 (1995) (analyzing the 
opinions of the 1994 Term of the Supreme Court in light of the ideas of revolution, 
constitutional change, and legal continuity); J.W. Harris, When and Why Does the 
Grundnorm Change?, 29 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 103 (1971) (discussing the legal revolutions of 
Pakistan, Uganda and Southern Rhodesia); A.M. Honore, Reflections on Revolutions, 2 
IRISH JURIST 268 (1967) (discussing how laws and legal systems evolve out of revolutions); 
T.C. Hopton, Grundnorm and Constitution: The Legitimacy of Politics, 24 MCGILL L.J. 72 
(1978) (discussing the flaws in the logic of the Rhodesian judiciary's decisions impacting 
the Rhodesian legal revolution); Stanley N. Katz, Constitutionalism and Revolution, 14 
CARDOZO L. REV. 635 (1993) (providing a critique of conference papers on the 
constitutional relevance of eighteenth-century revolutions to the modern European 
revolutions of 1989-91, and concluding that constitutional theory can help clarify the 
arguments but cannot effectively inform the practical solutions to modern constitutional 
options); Ali Khan, A Legal Theory of Revolutions, 5 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1 (1987) (suggesting 
a theoretical framework for judicial analysis of revolution and arguing that revolutions 
gain legitimacy and legal authority only through social acceptance of succession rules and 
of the revolution itself); Robert Justin Lipkin, Conventionalism, Pragmatism, and 
Constitutional Revolutions, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 645 (1988) (discussing the importance 
of recognizing constitutional revolutions and criticizing the failure of Ronald Dworkin's 
theory of "law as integrity" to consider the pragmatic side of such revolutions); Robert 
Justin Lipkin, The Anatomy of Constitutional Revolutions, 68 NEB. L. REV. 701 (1989) 
(presenting the theory of constitutional revolutions as two distinct movements-
revolutionary adjudication and normal adjudication-and arguing that the theory of 
constitutional revolutions better explains and resolves the current law than a coherence or 
unitaristic theory); David A.J. Richards, Revolution and Constitutionalism in America, 14 
CARDOZO L. REV. 577 (1993) (analyzing America's constitutionalism in terms of its 
historical revolutions-first from the principles that led to the American Revolution and 
then the battle over those constitutional principles in the Civil War, leading to the 
Reconstruction Amendments); Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court, 1998 Term-
Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 
113 HARV. L. REV. 29, 31 (1999) (stating that it "seems useful to think about U.S. 
constitutional history as constituting of a succession of regimes"). 
11. 531 u.s. 98 (2000). 
12. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional 
Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1108 (2001 ); see also BRUCE ACKERMAN, Off Balance, 
in BUSH V. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY 192, 199 (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002) 
(describing the "revolutionary jurisprudence" behind the decision); Ward Farnsworth, 
"To Do a Great Right, Do a Little Wrong": A User's Guide to Judicial Lawlessness, 86 
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decision was illegal.U But the word "coup" suggests more than that. 
A coup is an act that, although illegal from the perspective of the 
legal system within which it occurred, becomes legal through a 
revolutionary change of legal systems. To be a coup, popular 
acceptance of the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore must 
have lifted us out of one legal realm and placed us into another, the 
way events in 1789 lifted France out of absolute monarchy and into 
democracy.14 
Despite the hold that revolutions have on the legal imagination,15 
there has been a reluctance to consider the structure of legal systems 
that makes discontinuity between them possible. A legal revolution 
occurs when chains of legal justification are broken. Although these 
chains had led to one ultimate lawmaker (e.g., Louis XVI), they now 
lead to another (e.g., the National Assembly or the people of France). 
Legal revolutions are possible only assuming laws are structured into 
legal systems in this fashion. And yet there is little discussion of just 
what this structure is like. 
The goal of this Article is to begin to fill this gap by examining 
six mistakes concerning legal revolutions that arise when the structure 
of legal systems is ignored. My discussion will focus on concrete 
examples of these mistakes, drawn from a wide variety of sources, 
including the writings of Akhil Amar (who will provide a particularly 
rich source), the Supreme Court of Pakistan's validation of a coup in 
1958, the nineteenth-century legal theory of John Austin and 
criticisms of Bush v. Gore. 
In the end, I hope to show that a formalist approach has a place 
within legal theory. The anti-formalist bias in the United States has 
made legal scholars deeply suspicious of viewing the law as a 
structured system.16 This suspicion, I will argue, has allowed 
MINN. L. REv. 227, 228 (2001) (arguing that the decision in Bush v. Gore was "lawless" 
and the use of an "extralegal judicial power."). 
13. See Farnsworth, supra note 12, at 228-35. 
14. See infra Section VI. C. 
15. Another example of academic interest in legal revolutions is Bruce Ackerman's 
and Akhil Amar's long-standing dispute about the legality of the ratification of the 
Constitution. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 41-42, 167-99 
(1991); Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 456 
(1989); Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment 
Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 463-86 (1994) [hereinafter Amar, Consent); 
Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 
55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1047-50 (1988) [hereinafter Amar, Philadelphia). 
16. In showing the benefits of a structural approach to legal systems, I hope to 
vindicate the form of legal analysis first employed in the early twentieth century by the 
Vienna School of legal theory, and especially by Hans Kelsen. I will borrow liberally, 
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fundamental errors of leg.al reasoning to exist undetected. 
I. FIRST MISTAKE: LEGALLY JUSTIFYING LEGAL AXIOMS 
A. Legal Axioms 
A law can exist only as part of a system of lawsY Consider 
section 205.3(b)(l) of Volume 17 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 
which requires attorneys practicing before the Securities Exchange 
Commission to report evidence of material securities violations.18 
This law is a command, in the sense that it establishes a standard of 
conduct for behavior.19 We can determine the system to which this 
command belongs by identifying the authorization that gives it 
validity. Authorizations are laws that confer upon the authorized 
party the power to create new law, whether that new law is a 
command or a further authorization.20 Authorizations and commands 
are fundamental elements out of which legal systems are built-the 
laws in a legal system can be categorized as authorizations or 
commands.21 
albeit selectively, from the Vienna School in many of my arguments. See generally 
KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY (Bonnie Litschewski 
Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson trans., Clarendon Press 1992) (1934) [hereinafter 
INTRODUCTION] (discussing a theory of law purified of political ideology and empirical 
elements); HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (Max Knight trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 
1967) (1960) [hereinafter PuRE THEORY] (attempting to solve the fundamental problems 
of a "pure" theory of law). Other important members of the Vienna School were Adolf 
Merkl and Fritz Sander, see generally ADOLF MERKL, ALLGEMEINES 
VERWALTUNGSRECHT (1927); ADOLF MERKL, PROLEGOMENA EINER THEORIE DES 
RECHTLICHEN STUFENBAUES IN GESELLSCHAFT, STAAT UNO RECHT: 
UNTERSUCHUNGEN ZUR REINEN RECHTSLEHRE 252 (Alfred Verdross, ed. 1931); FRITZ 
SANDER, DAS FAKTUM DER REVOLUTION UNO DIE KONTINUITAT DER 
RECHTSORDNUNG, 1 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR OFFENTLICHES RECHT 132 (1919-20). 
17. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE THEORY OF LEGAL SYSTEMS 1-4 (2d ed. 1980); INTRODUCTION, supra note 16, at 
55-75. 
18. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1) (2004). 
19. Kelsen understands commands as directed to officials only. PURE THEORY, supra 
note 16, at 114-17. They obligate officials to sanction non-compliance with the identified 
standard of conduct. /d. For a discussion of Kelsen's approach, see RONALD MOORE, 
LEGAL NORMS AND LEGAL SCIENCE: A CRITICAL STUDY OF KELSEN'S PuRE THEORY 
OF LAW 137-40 (1978). Nothing about my analysis here presupposes Kelsen's definition 
of a command. 
20. PURE THEORY, supra note 16, at 118; see also MOORE supra note 19, at 77. 
21. INTRODUCTION, supra note 16, at 23-25; PuRE THEORY, supra note 16, at 76-81. 
Kelsen understands authorization and command as relationships (of "imputation" or 
"Zurechnung") between the elemental legal meanings of events. See Stanley L. Paulson, 
Hans Kelsen's Doctrine of Imputation, 14 RATIO JURIS 47 (2001). These relationships 
build up complex legal meanings by a "functional connection[s] of elements," similar to 
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In the case of section 205.3(b )(1), its immediate authorization is 
section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Sarbanes-Oxley"),22 
which gave the Securities Exchange Commission the power to 
establish minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys 
practicing before the Commission.23 Sarbanes-Oxley, in turn, is valid 
law because Congress was authorized under Article I, section 8 of the 
Constitution to "regulate Commerce ... among the several States. "24 
Furthermore, the Commerce Clause has remained valid law because 
the conventions or legislatures of three-fourths of the states, who are 
authorized by Article V to enact amendments to the Constitution,25 
refrained from exercising their power to remove the Clause. Finally, 
the Commerce Clause and Article V are valid law because Article 
VII authorized the conventions of the original thirteen states to enact 
the Constitution.26 
This chain cannot go on forever; legal systems must terminate in 
a final authorizing law.27 This final law will, of course, have a source 
of some sort. In the case of Article VII, the responsible party was the 
Constitutional Convention. But whatever this source is, it was not 
legally authorized to create the law. There is no law authorizing the 
Constitutional Convention to create Article VII, the way there is a 
law authorizing the SEC to create section 205.3(b)(l) or Congress to 
create Sarbanes-Oxley. We are, of course, free to argue that there is 
a law authorizing the Convention, but if we succeed that simply 
the way that logical rules build the complex meaning of sentences out of the meaning of 
words. See Michael Steven Green, Hans Kelsen and the Logic of Legal Systems, 54 ALA. 
L. REV. 365, 388-89 (2003). These details in Kelsen's theory can be ignored for the 
purposes of this article. 
Kelsen also speaks of positive permissions as another relationship of imputation. 
PURE THEORY, supra note 16, at 118. But this appears to be nothing more than the 
granting of an exception or license to what is generally prohibited behavior. /d. at 138. It 
therefore seems reducible to command and authorization. 
22. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245 (West Supp. 2004). 
23. /d. 
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct 
for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 33-8185, (2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. 
L. Rep. (CCH) 'li 86,823 at 87,069-110 (Jan. 29, 2003). 
25. U.S. CONST. art. V. That is, if the amendment is proposed by a two-thirds vote of 
both houses of Congress or the legislative will of two-thirds of the states. /d. 
26. U.S. CONST. art. VII. All thirteen states ratified the Constitution, although it took 
North Carolina until November 21, 1789 and Rhode Island (who failed to send any 
delegates to the Constitutional Convention) until May 29, 1790. HANNIS TAYLOR, THE 
ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 218-19 (1911). For the 
pressures to ratify exerted by the new United States upon these two foreign nations in its 
midst, see David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First 
Congress, 1789-1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 835-38 (1994). 
27. For a contrary view, see RAZ, supra note 17, at 32. 
HeinOnline -- 83 N.C. L. Rev. 338 2004-2005
338 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
means that Article VII is not the final authorizing law. Furthermore, 
whoever was responsible for what actually is the final authorizing law 
was not legally authorized to create it.28 
If Article VII is the final authorizing law, it is the axiom of the 
American legal system. Furthermore, the lawmaker identified by this 
axiom-the conventions of the original 13 states-is the supreme 
lawmaker in that legal system, the American sovereign. See Figure A. 
28. The structure I am employing here follows from the Stufenbau (or hierarchical) 
theory of legal norms introduced by Adolf Merkl. See, e.g., Adolf Merkl, Prolegomena 
einer Theorie des rechtlichen Stufenbaues in GESELLSCHAFT, STAAT UND RECHT: 
UNTERSUCHUNGEN ZUR REINEN RECHTSLEHRE 252 (Alfred Verdross, ed., 1931). 
Merkl strongly influenced Kelsen, who made the Stufenbau approach an essential element 
of his legal theory. See INTRODUCTION, supra note 16, at 55-75; PURE THEORY, supra 
note 16, at 221-78; WILLIAM EBENSTEIN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW 131-206 (1945) 
(photo. reprint 1969); JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF LEGAL SYSTEM 95-100 (2d ed. 1980); William 
Ebenstein, The Pure Theory of Law: Demythologizing Legal Thought, 59 CAL L. REV. 
617,642-44 (1971). 
Notably absent from my account, however, is Kelsen's theory of the basic norm. 
The basic norm authorizes the creators of the axiom. See INTRODUCTION, supra note 16, 
at 58; PURE THEORY, supra note 16, at 199, 226; Green, supra note 21, at 388-89. It is not 
itself positive law-that is, a law actually issued by a person-the way Article VII is. 
Green, supra note 21, at 388-89. The basic norm is instead presupposed by anyone who 
knows the laws of the legal system. /d. For example, anyone who knows American law 
must be presupposing a norm that authorized the Constitutional Congress to make Article 
VII. /d. Kelsen's theory of the basic norm is motivated in large respect by the Kantian 
dimensions of his legal theory, which need not concern us here. See id. at 389-405; 
Norbert Leser, Die Reine Rechtslehre im Widerstreit der philosophischen ldeen, in DIE 
REINE RECHTSLEHRE IN WISSENSCHAFTLICHER DISKUSSION 97, 101-02 (1982); 
CARSTEN HEIDEMANN, DIE NORM ALS TATSACHE: ZUR NORMENTHEORIE HANS 
KELSENS 348-50 (1997). On Kelsen's Kantianism generally, see Green, supra note 21; 
Stanley L. Paulson, Introduction, in INTRODUCTION, supra note 7, at v; Alida Wilson, Is 
Kelsen Really a Kantian?, in ESSAYS ON KELSEN 37 (Richard Tur & William Twining eds., 
1986). 
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Figure A 
. , 
The inability to trace a law that is now considered valid back to 
what was the sovereign in a legal system means that a legal revolution 
has occurred. For example, a revolution occurred in France in 1789, 
because valid laws were no longer traceable back to Louis XVI. The 
American Revolution occurred because, at some point between 1776 
and 1783, valid laws could no longer be traced back to the sovereign 
within the British legal system-the King-in-Parliament.29 
B. Legal Axioms Cannot Be Legally Justified 
Unlike the other laws within a legal system, a legal axiom does 
not have a legal justification, in the sense that it cannot be shown to 
be valid in light of a higher authorization.3° This can make the axiom 
29. See VERNON BOGDANOR, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS ON 
BRITISH GOVERNMENT 5 (1996) ("[T]here is a sense in which the British Constitution can 
be summed up in eight words: What the Queen in Parliament enacts is law."); see also 
JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT: HISTORY AND 
PHILOSOPHY 9-10 (1999) (arguing that the essence of the seventeenth century King-in-
Parliament's sovereignty was that "no other human agency possess[ed]legal authority to 
override or hold invalid any statute that Parliament enact[ed]"). 
30. As Kelsen put it: "[T]o attempt juristically to determine the choice of juristic 
starting point would be like trying to climb on one's own shoulders; it would be like the 
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and the sovereign it authorizes look illegitimate. But to the extent 
that an attempt to justify the axiom is not circular, it will distort the 
very legal system it is supposed to support. 
To illustrate, imagine that someone in 1788 used a decision by a 
French court that said Louis XVI was an absolute monarch to legally 
justify his absolute monarchy. If Louis was an absolute monarch, this 
justification would be circular. The court's authority to make 
determinations of the law would exist only because of Louis XVI's 
power. And if the person justifying Louis's authority attempted to 
remove this circularity by insisting that Louis XVI had his authority 
only because the courts of France said so, this would make the courts, 
not Louis, sovereign. 
When a justification of a legal axiom appeals to laws issued by a 
subordinate lawmaker within that legal system, it distorts the 
structure of the system by making this subordinate supreme. When it 
appeals to laws issued by a lawmaker in another legal system, it 
merges two systems into one. For example, imagine someone in 1787 
attempted to justify the axiom of the American legal system by 
reference to British law. One possibility would be the Treaty of Paris 
of 1783, in which Great Britain recognized the United States.31 
Another would be the recognition of American law by British courts, 
that is, the willingness of these courts to apply American law to 
events occurring within territory claimed by the United States.32 
Although these justifications may make sense of the role of 
American law within the British legal system, they distort the 
American legal system itself. First of all, there is no reason that 
British law should recognize American laws as valid for the same 
reason that they are valid within the American legal system itself. 
From the perspective of British law, the axiom of the American 
system, which we are assuming is Article VII, may be irrelevant. The 
British might consider American laws to be valid because they have 
their source in a government that is efficacious-in the sense that its 
commands tend to be obeyed by the population. 
attempt of Miinchhausen to pull himself out of the swamp by his own hair." HANS 
KELSEN, DAS PROBLEM DER SOUVERANITAT UNO DIE THEORIE DES VOLKERRECHTS 
97 (1920). 
31. Or, more correctly, the thirteen states. See Definitive Treaty of Peace, Sept. 3, 
1783, art. I, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 8 Stat. 80, 81 , reprinted in 2 TREATIES AND OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1776--1818, 151 (Hunter 
Miller ed., 1931). 
32. By the time of the Treaty of Paris, foreign law was employed by English common 
law courts in cases having a foreign element. Alexander N. Sack, Conflicts of Laws in the 
History of the English Law, in 3 LAW: A CENTURY OF PROGRESS 342, 398 (1937). 
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Because Britons and Americans may use different criteria for 
determining the validity of American law, a revolutionary change of 
the American legal system may not be seen as such under British law. 
Assume, for example, that Congress decides to repeal the Fourteenth 
Amendment by a simple majority vote and the President signs the 
repeal. Assume further that the American public, after considerable 
grumbling, acquiesces and the repeal is treated as law. From the 
perspective of the American legal system, this would be a legal 
revolution because the repeal, although now accepted as legally valid, 
could not be traced back to the authority identified in Article VII. 
But from the perspective of the British legal system, the American 
legal system might exist unchanged because the same cast of 
characters in the American government, namely Congress and the 
President, is obeyed by the population. 
The most significant distortion of justifying American laws by 
reference to British law, however, is that it makes the validity of 
American laws ultimately depend upon the sovereign within the 
British system. The American system and its laws will have their 
ultimate validity in the King-in-Parliament. There would be no 
independent American legal system. 
As a consequence, the American Revolution would not really 
have occurred. If American laws were valid only because of their 
recognition by the British system, then valid laws in English-speaking 
North America would have remained uniformly traceable back to the 
King-in-Parliament. Before the recognition, all valid laws would be 
traceable back to that source, for the simple reason that the only valid 
laws were British ones. After the recognition, there would be valid 
American laws, but they, too, would be traceable back to the King-in-
Parliament, through the act of recognition. See Figure B. 
Figure B 
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The American legal system is no less distorted when its axiom is 
justified by reference to international law. Once again, Article VII 
may not be relevant under international law. Efficacy, or some other 
principle, may matter instead. Furthermore, such a justification 
ultimately makes the validity of American laws depend upon the 
axiom of the international system.33 Such justification leaves no place 
for an independent American legal system. All that would exist is an 
international system, within which the American system played a 
subordinate role. The same would hold true for those other domestic 
legal systems that owed their existence only to recognition under 
international law. See Figure C. 
Figure C 
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From the perspective of the international legal system, 
revolution would be impossible. To be sure, changes in domestic 
legal systems would occur from within the international system, in the 
33. For the purposes of this Article, we shall have to leave the questions of the axiom 
and sovereign of the international system vague. For a discussion of these issues, see 
INTRODUCTION, supra note 16, at 107-08; PURE THEORY, supra note 16, at 318-20. The 
international legal system could be primary even though, having no organs of 
enforcement, it had to rely upon the actions of subordinate domestic legal systems to 
enforce its laws. See INTRODUCTION, supra note 16, at 108-11; PURE THEORY, supra 
note 16, at 320-22. This would be analogous to a domestic legal system that engaged only 
in lawmaking and adjudication, leaving enforcement to private individuals. See 
INTRODUCTION, supra note 16, at 108-11; PURE THEORY, supra note 16, at 320-22. 
HeinOnline -- 83 N.C. L. Rev. 343 2004-2005
2005] LEGAL REVOLUTIONS 343 
sense that the changes followed from the international system's 
principle for recognizing domestic systems (which, we can assume, is 
efficacy). For example, the American Revolution would have 
occurred within the international system, because some time between 
1776 and 1783 the American government (or the state governments) 
supplanted the King-in-Parliament as the efficacious lawmakers 
among most English-speakers in North America. At that point 
American (or state) and not British law became valid under 
international law. This change would not be a legal revolution, 
however, for the axiom on the basis of which the old and the new laws 
are justified would remain the same. Both British law and the 
American law that supplanted it would be valid only because of the 
principle of efficacy, which owes its validity to the axiom of the 
international legal system. The ultimate principle of legal validity 
would not change. 
C. Amar on the American Axiom 
In short, legal systems and revolutionary changes of these 
systems can be understood only if legal axioms are left legally 
unjustified. Our first mistake concerning legal revolutions occurs 
when this lesson is forgotten. An example of this mistake can be 
found in the writings of Akhil Amar.34 I will begin, however, with 
Amar's novel account of the American legal system. 
I have suggested that the axiom of the American legal system is 
Article VII and that the lawmaker identified in that axiom-the 
conventions of the thirteen original states-is the American 
sovereign. Amar also takes the ratification of the Constitution to be 
important in identifying the American sovereign. But he believes the 
true axiom of our legal system is not Article VIJ.35 It is instead the 
more comprehensive "legal right of the polity to alter or abolish their 
government at any time and for any reason, by a peaceful and simple 
majoritarian process. "36 
34. See infra notes 44-53 and accompanying text. 
35. Amar, Consent, supra note 15, at 470-75. 
36. !d. at 458. See also Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican 
Government: Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 749, 750 (1994) [hereinafter Amar, Denominator] ("At the Founding, the 
very act of constitution itself-of ordainment and establishment-embodied the first 
principles of Republican Government: the right of the sovereign people, via a special 
convention, to alter their existing constitution by simple majority vote."); Akhil Reed 
Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1435-36 (1987) [hereinafter 
Amar, Sovereignty] (describing the essence of popular sovereignty in America as "the 
right of the People to alter or abolish their government .... "); Amar, Philadelphia, supra 
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In fact, Amar argues that this right of popular sovereignty is the 
axiom of fourteen different legal systems. It is the axiom of each of 
the thirteen state systems that existed prior to ratification, and it is the 
axiom of the American legal system that was the result of the 
ratification.37 In each of the fourteen systems a different people are 
sovereign. In each state system, the people of that state are 
sovereign, and, in the American legal system, the people of the 
United States as a whole are sovereign. Within each state system, a 
constitution for that state can be created, without revolution, by a 
simple process in which the majority of the people of that state vote 
for the constitution.38 Likewise, within the American legal system, a 
constitution for the United States can be created, without revolution, 
by a simple process in which the majority of the people of the United 
States as a whole vote for the constitution.39 
Amar believes that Article VII played a crucial role in bridging 
the gap between the sovereignty of the state peoples and the 
sovereignty of the people of the United States. Indeed, its most 
important function was not establishing the Constitution, but 
enabling this delegation of sovereignty. After the delegation, the 
method by which future constitutions could be legally created was 
radically altered. Prior to the delegation, each state people, being 
sovereign, could not be bound by law that did not have its source in 
that people's will. Article VII respected this sovereignty of the state 
peoples, Amar argues, because each people had to agree individually 
to delegate its sovereignty.40 Although the Article VII process was 
effective with the ratification of nine of the thirteen states, the effect 
was only "between the States so ratifying the [Constitution]."41 After 
the delegation was complete, however, sovereignty rested in a new 
people, the people of the United States. That new sovereign could 
create constitutions in the future by its simple majority vote. If the 
people of the United States voted for a new constitution, it would be 
binding, even if the people of an individual state objected. 
Because the American people are now sovereign, the American 
note 15, at 1044 (stating that "the first, most undeniable inalienable and important, if 
unenumerated right of the People is the right of a majority of voters to amend the 
Constitution .... "). 
37. Amar, Consent, supra note 15, at 488 n. 15; Amar, Denominator, supra note 36, at 
767; Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 15, at 1062--{)3. 
38. Amar, Denominacor, supra note 36, at 773; Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 15, at 
1051-52. 
39. Amar, Consent, supra note 15, at 458-59, 501. 
40. Amar, Sovereignty, supra note 36, at 1459--{)0. 
41. U.S. CONST. art. VII. 
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legal system can endure even if there is dramatic constitutional 
change, for example, the wholesale scrapping of the Constitution and 
its replacement by a parliamentary government of the British variety. 
Valid laws will still be traceable back to the same sovereign, as long as 
the constitutional change is ratified democratically by the majority of 
the American people as a whole. For this reason, Amar argues that 
Article V is not the sole method of constitutional change within our 
legal system. It is merely a means of constitutional change from 
within our current Constitution. The people can make Article V 
irrelevant, however, by enacting a new constitution through a simple 
majoritarian process. 
I will argue in Part V that the alienation of sovereignty that 
Amar attributes to the Article VII process is impossible, which forces 
him into the position that the ratification was as much of a revolution 
as the independence of the thirteen state legal systems from the 
British system. Indeed, the belief that a sovereign can alienate or 
limit its authority (as well as the belief that it can authorize its own 
authority) is the fifth mistake concerning legal revolutions. My 
current goal, however, is to show that even if Amar is right about 
Article VII, he succumbs to the first mistake concerning legal 
revolutions, because he offers legal justifications for why the people 
are sovereign within the state systems. 
To his credit, Amar does not argue that popular sovereignty is 
the axiom of these systems simply because a popular vote is the 
morally valid means of creating a constitution for a people.42 If this 
were his argument, he would have to accept that popular sovereignty 
is the axiom of every legal system-for if the American peoples have 
a moral right to control the constitution under which they live, so do 
all other peoples. 
If all laws depended upon such moral validation, the American 
Revolution would not have occurred. After all, the (unwritten) 
British constitution, which gave lawmaking authority to the King-in-
Parliament, was not ratified by any of the American peoples-and 
not by the British people either, at least in the eighteenth century. 
From the perspective of the axiom of popular sovereignty, British 
laws that applied to the Colonies before the American Revolution, 
indeed British laws as a whole, were void. Instead of a revolutionary 
change in valid law, abiding sovereigns-namely the peoples of the 
states-would have finally spoken. 
42. Amar, Consent, supra note 15, at 499. 
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In fact , if the moral axiom of popular sovereignty were the axiom 
of every legal system, no revolutions would have ever occurred. The 
peoples of the world would always be the ultimate source of valid law, 
and any putative law from another source would simply be void. 
Louis XVI decrees before 1789 would not be valid laws, since they 
could not be traced to the true sovereign, the people of France. 
There would be no revolutions-that is, shifts of sovereignty-only 
cases of abiding sovereigns choosing to speak or falling into silence. 
Furthermore, because the valid laws of each domestic system 
would be traceable back to the same moral axiom, these laws would 
inhabit the same moral/international legal system. The difference 
between the valid laws of France and valid laws of the United States 
would be no more significant than the difference between laws 
enacted by subsidiary lawmakers within the American legal system 
(such as Congress and the state legislatures). See Figure D. 
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Instead of offering such a moral argument, Amar claims that 
particular social events in English-speaking North America 
established popular sovereignty as the legal axiom of the American 
systems by the time of the Founding. These events gave the pre-
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existing moral right to choose one's government a "legal form that it 
lacked before 1776. "43 
This means that popular sovereignty is not the ultimate legal 
basis for constitutional validity in all legal systems. It did not apply in 
the French legal system before 1789 (and maybe not even after). And 
because it also did not apply to the eighteenth century British legal 
system, there was an American Revolution. Sovereigns changed-
ultimate lawmaking authority shifted from the King-in-Parliament to 
the American peoples. 
But Amar's argument that popular sovereignty became the 
axiom of the state legal systems by the late eighteenth century 
succumbs to the first mistake. Trained to give legal arguments, he 
cannot help but give further legal justifications for why popular 
sovereignty was the law. But this is precisely what Amar should not 
do. If these justifications are non-circular, which they must to be 
justifications at all, the principle of popular sovereignty must legally 
depend upon the authority standing behind the law to which he 
appeals. The sovereignty of the people will be extinguished because 
the ultimate source of valid law will be this new authority. 
Of course, the most serious problem for Amar-to which I have 
already alluded and which I discuss in greater detail in Part V-is his 
argument that popular sovereignty is the axiom of the American legal 
system because it had that role in the state legal systems. Unless the 
delegation of sovereignty is possible, such a justification threatens to 
make the validity of American law dependent upon the sovereigns of 
the state legal systems. American law would be binding upon a state 
only to the extent that the people of the state say so. These peoples 
could extinguish their legal obligations under American law at will, as 
the people of South Carolina attempted to do in 1861. 
But Amar's arguments put even the sovereignty of the people of 
each state at risk. For example, he offers the statement in Virginia's 
Declaration of Rights that "all power is vested in, and consequently 
derived from, the people" as having "established popular sovereignty 
as [Virginia's] legal cornerstone."44 And yet the Virginia Declaration 
was a product of the Virginia state legislature. The people of Virginia 
did not grant the legislature the authority to enact it, nor did they 
subsequently ratify it.45 If the Declaration really established the 
43. Amar, Consent, supra note 15, at 464; see also id. at 462-87 (describing gradual 
entrenchment of popular sovereignty as the ultimate justification of legality in the states). 
44. Amar, Consent, supra note 15, at 477. 
45. Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U. CHI. L. 
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Virginian people's lawmaking power, they have lawmaking authority 
only because the Virginia state legislature gave it to them. The 
legislature, not the people, would be sovereign. Of course, Amar can 
insist that the state legislature itself has lawmaking authority only 
because the people gave it this power. But the Declaration cannot 
legally justify this fact. 
Amar must be understood, not as legally justifying the axiom of 
popular sovereignty, but as extra-legally explaining why the peoples 
of the states were in legal systems in which popular sovereignty was 
the axiom.46 If he is successful, he will have shown why legal 
justification stopped at popular sovereignty without the need for 
further legal justification-precisely what Amar himself is so 
reluctant to do. The statement in the Declaration, rather than being 
an act of lawmaking, would simply be the exemplification of popular 
sovereignty's axiomatic role among those legally reasoning within the 
system. 
D. Amar on the Articles of Confederation 
The first mistake can also be found in Amar's argument that 
there was no revolutionary break between the Articles of the 
Confederation and the ratification of the Constitution. Actually, 
there are three possible revolutions at issue here, each of which Amar 
denies occurred: (1) a revolutionary creation of one American legal 
system out of the state legal systems at the time of the Articles of 
Confederation; (2) a revolutionary recreation of the state legal 
systems through the dissolution of the Articles; and (3) a 
revolutionary creation (or recreation) of the American legal system 
out of the state systems with the ratification of the Constitution. 
The Articles and the Constitution look legally discontinuous 
because the Constitution was not ratified in accordance with the 
amendment procedures of the Articles.47 Under Article VII of the 
Constitution, the "Ratification of the Conventions of nine States" was 
sufficient for the establishment of the Constitution "between the 
States so ratifying the Same."48 If nine state conventions agreed, they 
could legally obligate their states to abide by the new Constitution. 
In contrast, under Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation, valid 
amendment required the approval of Congress and the confirmation 
REV. 475,486 n.30 (1995). 
46. See infra Section II.A. 
47. See Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 8, at 478-80. 
48. U.S. CONST. art. VII. 
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of the legislatures of every State.49 The agreement of nine state 
conventions would therefore be a legal nullity. 
Amar escapes this problem by arguing that the Articles 
themselves were no longer binding in 1787: 
Of course, Article VII is inconsistent with the best reading of 
Article XIII, but to declare Article VII therefore illegal is to 
beg the question of the legal status of Article XIII, and the rest 
of the Articles of Confederation, in 1787. I believe, as did many 
Federalists in 1787, that the Articles of Confederation were a 
mere treaty among thirteen otherwise free and independent 
nations. That treaty had been notoriously, repeatedly, and 
flagrantly violated on every side by 1787. Under standard 
principles of international law, these material breaches of a 
treaty freed each party-that is, each of the thirteen states-to 
disregard the pact, if it so chose. Thus, if in 1787 nine (or more) 
states wanted, in effect, to secede from the Articles of 
Confederation and form a new system, that was their legal right, 
Article XIII notwithstanding.50 
If Amar is correct that the state legal systems possessed full 
independence at the time of the ratification of the Constitution, his 
sole problem is the third revolution-the transfer of sovereignty from 
the peoples of the states to the people of the United States through 
the ratification of the Constitution. I have set aside this problem until 
Part V. 
But Amar's argument that the states were released from their 
obligations under the Articles suffers from the first mistake. Assume 
he is right that the Articles were a treaty between independent 
states.51 If so, the legal obligations created by the Articles must be 
traceable back to the ultimate authority within each state system, 
namely the people of that state. The powers of the United States 
government under the Articles would exist for a state only as long as 
49. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII (1777). 
50. Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 15, at 1048. See also Amar, Consent, supra note 
15, at 465-66 (1994) ("By 1787, the Articles had been routinely and flagrantly violated on 
all sides. And under well-established legal principles in 1787, these material breaches 
freed each compacting party-each state-to disregard the pact, if it so chose."). 
51. See supra note 50 and accompanying text; see also Charles Fried, Foreword: 
Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13, 21 (1995) ("Under the Articles, residual political 
authority remained in the thirteen states"). See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II 
(1777) ("Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, 
jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United 
States, in Congress assembled."). 
HeinOnline -- 83 N.C. L. Rev. 350 2004-2005
350 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
these powers were recognized by its people. Indeed, there would be 
no such thing as an American legal system or American law. Instead 
there would be thirteen separate state legal systems, containing 
incommensurable sets of state laws called "American law."52 See 
Figure E. 
Figure E 
But if the people of each state are sovereign within their legal 
system, why is Amar concerned to show that the states were released 
from their legal obligations under the Articles? Whatever obligations 
New Hampshire had under the Articles were obligations only because 
the people of New Hampshire said so. And by deciding to ignore the 
Articles, including their amendment procedures, the people of New 
Hampshire made it clear that the Articles no longer had any legal 
force. 
By appealing to principles of international law that apparently 
bind the people of New Hampshire independently of their consent, 
52. The Articles put upon every state an obligation to "abide by the determinations of 
the United States in Congress assembled, on all questions which by this confederation are 
submitted to them." ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII (1777). It also declared 
the "Union" to be "perpetual." ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII (1777). But 
these can be understood as legal obligations that flowed from and were dependent upon 
the abiding consent of the people of each state. 
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Amar has once again threatened the very sovereignty he aims to 
defend. If the people of New Hampshire could escape their 
obligations under the Articles only by satisfying standards of 
international law, then their sovereignty would be lost even if they did 
succeed in escaping their obligations. The legal fact that the people 
of New Hampshire were released from their obligations could not be 
traced to the will of the people of New Hampshire. This binding 
international law would have to be explained in terms of some other 
sovereign, for example, the sovereign of the international legal system 
(whatever that is). 
To make Amar's position consistent, we have to reinterpret his 
appeal to international law. For example, we could understand him 
as speaking of the moral concerns that motivated the people of New 
Hampshire to exercise their legal power to extinguish New 
Hampshire's obligations under the Articles. The people of New 
Hampshire were not legally bound to respect such moral concerns. 
They could have extinguished New Hampshire's obligations for no 
reason at all. But, as a matter of fact, the violation of the terms of the 
Articles by other states was the reason they chose to exercise this 
plenary power.53 
53. There are, in fact, two other avenues for making Amar's appeal to international 
law consistent, although Amar himself would be unwilling to accept them. I have so far 
assumed that the sovereign has unrestricted lawmaking authority (except insofar as it may 
not make laws that alter its own authority). I have also assumed that the sovereign is 
indivisible. If these restrictions on sovereignty were set aside, as I believe they should, we 
could make sense of legal limits that would prevent the sovereign people of New 
Hampshire from simply negating the Articles at will. For example, one could argue that 
under the axiom of the New Hampshire legal system the people of New Hampshire have 
supreme lawmaking power only to the extent that they did not violate certain treaty 
obligations. These limitations would not be part of international law, since they would not 
be commanded by the sovereign of the international legal system (or indeed by any 
sovereign), but it would nevertheless be true that the people of New Hampshire were 
legally bound by them. See infra Section III.B. 
Another possibility is to assume divided sovereignty. On international issues the 
sovereign responsible for international law (whatever that is) would have supreme 
lawmaking authority and on domestic issues the people of New Hampshire would. The 
people of New Hampshire would be a supreme lawmaker, but only within a domestic 
realm. They would be bound by the decisions of the international sovereign as far as their 
ability to withdraw from the Articles was concerned. See infra Section Ill. C. 
But Amar would not accept either of these approaches, because he assumes 
(mistakenly, as we shall see) that sovereignty cannot be limited or divided. See Amar, 
Consent, supra note 15, at 507; Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 15, at 1062--63; Amar, 
Sovereignty, supra note 36, at 1435. 
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II. SECOND MISTAKE: CONFUSING EXTRA-LEGAL EXPLANATIONS 
WITH LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS 
As we have seen, legal systems will be misunderstood if axioms 
are legally justified. And yet it seems that some explanation must be 
given for why legal justification should stop at one axiom rather than 
another. Imagine that someone claimed that the Queen-in-
Parliament is the current sovereign of all of English-speaking North 
America. When confronted with laws, like Sarbanes-Oxley, that 
appear to be valid and not traceable to the Queen-in-Parliament's 
commands, he dug in his heels, arguing that these laws only seem 
valid because we are assuming the wrong axiom. Once one 
recognizes that the Queen-in-Parliament is the sovereign, these 
"laws" reveal themselves to be nullities. 
Because it is an axiom, we cannot, by definition, legally justify 
our choice over his. We can, however, explain why this person is an 
outlier-that is, why almost everyone in this country stops legal 
justification at Article VII (or something similar) rather than "what 
the Queen-in-Parliament says is law." This explanation cannot be a 
legal justification, of course, since the axiom is an axiom precisely 
because it has no such justification. The explanation must be extra-
legal in nature. The confusion of this extra-legal explanation of a 
legal axiom with its legal justification is our second mistake 
concerning legal revolutions. 
A. Extra-legal Explanations of Legal Axioms 
I have chosen the deliberately vague term "explanation," 
because it does not commit us to the view that the axiom can be 
reduced to what explains it. An example of a legal theorist who 
believes that legal axioms can be extra-legally explained, but who 
resists extra-legal reductionism, is Hans Kelsen. Kelsen accepts that 
legal axioms can be explained in terms of social facts. An 
authorization, he argues, is treated as the axiom of a legal system if it 
is efficacious, that is, if the population by and large obeys the laws 
identified by the authorization.54 But he insists that the axiom-and 
all other legal rules-cannot be reduced to such social facts.55 Legal 
rules are irreducibly legal in nature. 
54. PURE THEORY, supra note 16, at 210 ("As soon as the old constitution loses its 
effectiveness and the new one has become effective, the acts that appear with the 
subjective meaning of creating or applying legal norms are no longer interpreted by 
presupposing the old basic norm, but by presupposing the new one."). 
55. INTRODUCfiON, supra note 16, at 13-14; PURE THEORY, supra note 16, at 2. 
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Kelsen's position is comparable to the position in the philosophy 
of logic called "logicism." Consider an axiom of logic-that is, a 
logical rule, such as the law of non-contradiction, that is foundational 
and so cannot be logically justified. The logicist admits that why we 
accept the law of non-contradiction without justification can be 
explained physiologically, psychologically and sociologically, for 
example, in terms of the constitution of our brains, certain innate 
habits or instincts, and socialization by parents and teachers. He does 
not think, however, that the law, or any logical rules, can be reduced 
to the empirical facts that explain them. Logical rules are about 
logical states of affairs, which are not contingent upon anything 
empirical. 56 
In contrast, some philosophers of logic consider logical rules to 
be nothing over and above the physiological, psychological and 
sociological facts that explain our acceptance of them. According to 
this position, which is sometimes called "psychologism," the law of 
non-contradiction is constituted by facts about human brains, desires, 
or societies.57 For the psychologist, although the law of non-
contradiction cannot be logically justified, it can be empirically 
justified, since it is, in the end, reducible to empirical facts. 
A possible analogue to psychologism in legal theory is American 
legal realism. The realists sought to reduce legal rules to social 
facts-especially facts about judicial behavior. 58 For the realists, legal 
reasoning is ultimately a type of empirical-especially sociological-
56. Green, supra note 21, at 375--81. For the classic expression of logicism, the view 
that logical laws concern abstract objects rather than psychological states, see GOTILOB 
FREGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ARITHMETIC v-viii , 33-38 (J.L. Austin trans., Basil 
Blackwell 2d ed. 1959) (1884); 1 EDMUND HUSSERL, LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS 99-100 
(J.N. Findlay trans., Routledge and Kegan Paul 1970) (1900). On both Husserl 's and 
Frege's anti-psychologism, see MARTIN KUSCH, PSYCHOLOGISM: A CASE STUDY IN THE 
SOCIOLOGY OF PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE 30--62 (1995). 
57. See Richard R. Brockhaus, Realism and Psychologism in 19th Century Logic, 51 
PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 493, 495-96, 500-06 (1991). A classic expression of 
psychologism is 1 JOHN STEWART MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC 2 (Longman, Green & Co. 
1936) (1851 ). 
58. See WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE 
CONFLICTS OF LAWS 8 (1942); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the 
Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 828-29 (1935); Walter Wheeler Cook, 
Essay, in MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CREDOS OF SIXTEEN AMERICAN SCHOLARS 49, 57-
58 (Julius Rosenthal Found., Northwestern Univ. ed. 1987) (1941); Underhill Moore, 
Essay, in id. at 203; LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, at 3-44 
(1986). The legal realists often pointed to Holmes' famous statement in Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 461 (1897) , as anticipating this 
approach: "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact , and nothing more 
pretentious, are what I mean by the law." 
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inquiry. 
Although Kelsen and the legal realists are relatively clear about 
where they stand, other legal theorists are more difficult to 
categorize. Consider H.L.A. Hart. On the one hand, Hart appears to 
reduce the rule of recognition, which, as we shall see, he considers to 
be the foundation of a legal system, to social facts.59 On the other 
hand, Hart argues that attending to the internal perspective of the 
participants in the legal system is needed to avoid the purely external 
sociological approach of the legal realists.60 Hart's commitment to the 
internal point of view looks like a rejection of sociological 
reductionism and, for that reason, could put him in the same camp as 
Kelsen.61 From within the internal perspective of the participants, the 
existence of the rule of recognition is completely irrelevant to legal 
justification. 
If this reading of Hart is correct, then he is much like Kelsen in 
insisting that sociological explanation of legal axioms should not 
infect legal justification. Sociology can at most explain why legal 
justification stops at the axiom; it cannot actually justify the axiom. I 
shall adopt the Kelsen-Hart approach in this Article-and attempt a 
justification of this choice in the Conclusion. The second mistake 
concerning legal revolutions arises when the distinction between 
extra-legally explaining and legally justifying a legal axiom is 
forgotten. 
Let me begin by outlining in greater detail Hart's explanation of 
legal axioms.62 Hart explains legal axioms, and the legal systems 
generated from them, through rules of recognition, that is, practices 
among officials of enforcing norms only if they satisfy certain criteria. 
(He also argues that the bulk of the population must generally 
comply with what the rule of recognition determines to be valid laws.) 
For example, the rule of recognition of the British legal system is, 
59. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 110 (Penelope Bulloch & Joseph Raz 
eds., Clarendon Press 2d ed. 1994) ("[T]he rule of recognition exists only as a complex, but 
normally concordant, practice of the courts, officials, and private persons in identifying the 
law by reference to certain criteria. Its existence is a matter of fact."). 
60. /d. at 104-05. 
61. See Jeffrey D. Goldsworthy, The Self-Destruction of Legal Positivism, 10 OXFORD 
J. LEGAL STUD. 449, 450-51 (1990). For more discussion of the internal point of view in 
Hart, see Brian Bix, H. L.A. Hart and the Hermeneutic Turn in Legal Theory, 52 SMU L. 
REV. 167, 172-76 (1999); Richard Holton, Positivism and the Internal Point of View, 17 
LAW & PHIL. 597,600-06 (1998); Dennis Patterson, Explicating the Internal Point of View, 
52 SMU L. REV. 67,69-72 (1999). 
62. I use Hart's explanation of legal axioms because it is more developed than 
Kelsen's. I do so even though the lesson of distinguishing explanation from justification is 
clearer in Kelsen's work than Hart's. See Green, supra note 21, at 398-405. 
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roughly, the practice among British officials of enforcing only those 
norms that have their ultimate source in the Queen-in-Parliament.63 
A revolution, in turn, occurs when one rule of recognition is replaced 
by another.64 
According to Hart, when someone describes the conditions for 
legal validity, the person is either participating within a rule of 
recognition or describing the internal perspective of participants.65 
The rule of recognition can therefore extra-legally explain the axiom 
of a system, insofar as it shows what participants take to be the 
ultimate criterion for determining whether a norm should be 
enforced. For example, Article VII .is the axiom of the American 
legal system if participants in the American rule of recognition stop 
legal justification at Article VII without any felt need for further 
justification. 
Hart's explanation of the axiom of a legal system is not the same 
as a legal principle that is used to determine when a subsidiary system 
is recognized by a primary legal system. The two are easy to confuse, 
because Hart's explanation looks very much like a commonly 
accepted legal principle of recognition, namely the principle of 
efficacy. The existence of a rule of recognition requires efficacy, in 
the sense that the population must generally abide by the laws 
identified by the rule. But the recognition of a subsidiary legal system 
according to the principle of efficacy, unlike a rule of recognition, 
63. Technically, the rule of recognition is not itself a practice. It is instead an abstract 
object-perhaps a proposition-that is practiced by a population. Because there is an 
infinite number of rules of recognition in this sense, Hart cannot possibly be claiming that 
a rule of recognition is the ultimate source of legal validity. There is, after all, a rule of 
recognition in which I am emperor of the United States. According to that rule of 
recognition, my commands are valid law and Sarbanes-Oxley is not. Hart must instead be 
arguing that the ultimate source of legal validity is the social fact that a certain rule of 
recognition is practiced by a population. On the distinction between a rule of recognition 
and the practice of that rule, see JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACfiCE OF PRINCIPLE 77-78 
(2001). For ease of expression, however, I will ignore this distinction. 
64. Hart himself offers the example of the peaceful liberation of a colony from the 
United Kingdom. Initially colonial laws are part of the British legal system, because 
colonial officials, with the officials of Britain, have a practice of enforcing only those 
norms that have their source in the Queen-in-Parliament. See HART, supra note 59, at 120 
("[T]he legal system of the colony is plainly a subordinate part of a wider system 
characterized by the ultimate rule of recognition that what the Queen in Parliament enacts 
is law for (inter alia) the colony."). Eventually, however, "the ultimate rule of recognition 
changes, for the legal competence of Westminster Parliament to legislate for the former 
colony is no longer recognized by [the colony's) courts." ld. Where there was once one 
rule of recognition, and so one legal system, there are now two. The axiom for the new 
colonial legal system is no longer "what the Queen-in-Parliament commands is Jaw"; it is 
something like "what the colonial legislature commands is Jaw." ld. 
65. HART, supra note 59, at 90-91, 242. 
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does not explain the independent existence of the recognized legal 
system. The laws of the recognized system instead depend upon the 
axiom of the recognizing system. For this reason, a change of 
recognized legal systems, unlike a change of rules of recognition, is 
not a legal revolution. 
Although a primary legal system's principle for legally 
recognizing subsidiary legal systems is usually very similar to Hart's 
explanation of the axiom of a legal system, they can diverge. 
Consider Hart's example (written in 1961): 
We are, in fact, quite clear that the legal system in existence in 
the territory of the Soviet Union is not in fact that of the Tsarist 
regime. But if a statute of the British Parliament declared that 
the law of Tsarist Russia was still the law of Russian territory 
this would indeed have meaning and legal effect as part of 
English law referring to the USSR, but it would leave 
unaffected the truth of the statement of fact contained in our 
last sentence. The force and meaning of the statute would be 
merely to determine the law to be applied in English courts, 
and so in England, to cases with a Russian element.66 
Although the Soviet rule of recognition and so the Soviet legal system 
exist, the Soviet system does not satisfy the English principle for 
recognizing subsidiary legal systems. 
Because Hart offers an explanation of the axiom of a system, not 
a legal justification of the axiom, the explanation will not be appealed 
to when reasoning within the system. To the extent that one treats 
the existence of the rule of recognition itself as a legal justification for 
the axiom, one is not being true to the internal perspective of the 
participants in the rule and not accurately describing legal validity.67 
For example, assume that there is a rule of recognition according 
to which Louis XVI's word is taken as the final criterion for enforcing 
a norm. From the perspective of the participants, the existence of the 
rule of recognition is legally irrelevant. If it were relevant, there 
would be a different rule in place, in which "what Louis commands is 
law" is not simply accepted without justification. Instead a further 
reason would be demanded by the officials, namely the existence of a 
practice among them of accepting "what Louis XVI commands is 
law" as law. This would mean the officials are sovereign, not Louis 
XVI. France would be transformed from an absolute monarchy into 
66. !d. at 119-20. 
67. !d. at 1084)9. 
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an oligarchy. See Figure F. 
Figure F 
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Indeed, if such a rule existed, there would have been no French 
Revolution. Instead the abiding sovereign, the officials of France, 
would have simply changed the subordinate lawmaker to which they 
delegated their power from Louis XVI to the National Assembly (or 
the people of France it represented). See Figure G. 
Figure G 
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The point is that the officials either demand a further legal 
reason for the axiom or they do not. If they do not, then it is indeed 
the axiom. If they do, then whatever they give as a reason for the 
axiom is the true axiom (provided that they stop at that). But they 
cannot appeal to their very practice of treating the axiom as an axiom 
as the legal reason it is an axiom. 
B. Greenawalt on the American Axiom 
This does not mean that official acceptance can never 
legitimately be an ultimate criterion for valid law. As an example, 
consider Kent Greenawalt's attempt to articulate the rule of 
recognition of the American legal system.68 Greenawalt questions 
whether the legal reason that the United States Constitution69 is valid 
law is that it was ratified in accordance with Article VII.70 He 
concludes that the "more accurate modern characterization" is that 
the Constitution is valid law because of its "continued acceptance. "71 
On the one hand, Greenawalt could be understood as arguing that the 
Constitution is simply part of the axiom of the American legal 
system-that it is accepted as law without any justification at all. See 
Figure H. 
68. Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 
621, 630--660 (1987). 
69. Or, more correctly, those original provisions in the Constitution that were not 
introduced through Article V amendment procedures. 
70. Greenawalt, supra note 68, at 639-40. 
71. Id. at 640. He also makes similar claims about some amendments to the 
Constitution, such as the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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Figure H 
This, of course, would not be the justification of an axiom by appeal 
to a rule of recognition. 
On the other hand, Greenawalt might be understood as arguing 
that official acceptance is what would be used to legally justify the 
Constitution's validity. For example, if a good argument could be 
found for why the ratification of the Constitution actually failed to 
satisfy Article VII, officials would insist that the Constitution was still 
valid law and would give as their reason the fact that it has been 
accepted by them as law for a long time. 
Assuming that officials did offer such a justification for the 
Constitution's validity, rather than simply accepting it as law without 
demanding a legal justification at all, Greenawalt still would not have 
justified the axiom of our system by reference to the rule of 
recognition. Official acceptance would instead be an ultimate 
criterion of law under the rule of recognition. "What officials accept 
is law" would be the (or part of the) axiom of our legal system. 
Officials would be sovereign. To have justified the axiom of our 
system by reference to the rule of recognition, Greenawalt would 
have had to try to justify legally why official acceptance itself is an 
appropriate criterion and to use the fact that the officials accept their 
acceptance without justification as the justification. 
There may still be reasons to object to Greenawalt's 
characterization of the American axiom of course. If Greenawalt is 
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right, a (gradual) legal revolution occurred after 1787. In 1787 Article 
VII would have been given as the legal justification for the 
Constitution's validity, but now official acceptance is.72 But if there is 
a problem with his approach, it is inaccuracy, not incoherence. 
C. State v. Dosso 
Although Greenawalt does not make the mistake of using an 
extra-legal explanation of an axiom as its legal justification, an 
example of this mistake is not hard to find. Consider the case of State 
v. Dosso.73 In 1958, the President of Pakistan, Iskandar Mirza-in an 
attempt to circumvent a general election-abrogated the constitution 
(which had been promulgated by the Constituent Assembly two years 
earlier), dissolved the legislature, and declared martiallaw.74 A mere 
twenty days later, the Supreme Court of Pakistan, in the context of 
four consolidated criminal appeals, undertook to determine the legal 
validity of the coup.75 
In an opinion by Chief Justice Muhammed Munir, the court 
concluded that the coup had generated a new legal system in which 
the President's word was law.76 Granted, the President issued an 
order that the country was to be governed "as nearly as may be in 
accordance with the late Constitution.'m But the "Constitution" to 
which the President referred now existed only because the President 
comrp.anded it.78 See Figure I. 
72. Greenawalt himself recognizes this fact. !d. at 640. 
73. State v. Dosso, 1958 P.L.D. S. Ct. 533 (Pakistan). For a discussion of Dosso and 
it~ inter11ational reception, see Tayyab Mahmud, Jurisprudence of Successful Treason: 
Coups d'Etat & Common Law, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 49 (1994). 
74. Mahmud, supra note 73, at 54-57. 
75. Dosso, 1958 P.L.D. S. Ct. at 537-43. 
76. !d. at 541 ("Under the new legal order any law may at any time be changed by the 
President, and therefore there is no such thing as a fundamental right, there being no 
restriction on the President's law-making power."). 
77. !d. at 538. 
78. /d. at 541. 
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Furthermore, Munir argued that this new constitutional order 
was valid. The reason was the efficacy of the coup, that is, the 
conformity of the population and officials to the President's new 
decrees: 
[I]f the revolution is victorious in the sense that the persons 
assuming power under the change can successfully require the 
inhabitants of the country to conform to the new regime, then 
the revolution itself becomes a law-creating fact because 
thereafter its own legality is judged not by reference to the 
annulled Constitution but by reference to its own success. On 
the same principle the validity of the laws to be made thereafter 
is judged by reference to the new and not the annulled 
Constitution. Thus the essential condition to determine 
whether a Constitution has been annulled is the efficacy of the 
change.79 
There are two ways of understanding this principle of efficacy. On 
the one hand, it could be an extra-legal explanation of why a new 
legal system exists in which the President's word is law. Let us set this 
reading aside for a moment. Another possibility is that it is itself a 
79. !d. at 539. 
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legal justification of the President's lawmaking power. 
One way that the principle could legally justify the President's 
lawmaking power is if it was the axiom of the Pakistani legal system. 
This would mean that the coup was not a revolution. The situation 
would be similar to Amar's account of the American legal system, in 
the sense that radical constitutional change would be compatible with 
legal continuity. The only difference would be that, in Amar's United 
States, constitutional change occurs through popular ratification, 
whereas in Munir's Pakistan it occurs through a ruler achieving 
efficacy. The establishment of an efficacious system of command 
(including through repression) would be for Munir what majority 
votes are for Amar: the fundamental means by which valid 
constitutions are created within the legal system. Furthermore, 
contrary to Munir's own suggestion, it would not be the case that the 
axiom of the new legal system is "the President's word is law." The 
President would have lawmaking power only because he satisfied the 
axiom of efficacy. See Figure J. 
., 
T 
Figure J 
Another interpretation, which is suggested by Munir himself, is that 
the principle of efficacy is not the axiom of the Pakistani legal system, 
but instead has its source in internationallaw.80 If so, not only would 
80. !d. He argued that "a victorious revolution or a successful coup d'etat is an 
internationally recognised legal method of changing a Constitution." 
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the coup not be a revolution, the President would not even be 
sovereign. Instead he would be authorized by the sovereign of the 
international legal system. See Figure K. 
Figure K 
Finally, the principle could be a part of "international law" in the 
sense that it is used by a domestic (e.g., American) legal system when 
determining whether it should recognize other legal systems. This too 
would mean that the coup was not revolutionary and that the 
President was a subsidiary lawmaker, now within the other domestic 
legal system. 
Because Munir appears to believe that the President was 
sovereign81 and that his sovereignty was not legally continuous with 
the pre-coup regime,82 we cannot understand the principle of efficacy 
as a legal justification. It must instead be an extra-legal explanation 
(analogous to Hart's)83 of why a new legal system exists. Munir is 
81. /d. at 541. 
82. /d. at 538-39. 
83. See supra Section II.A. 
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arguing that, as a result of this efficacy, he is now in a legal system in 
which legal justifications stop with the axiom "the President's word is 
law." 
But if that is the case, then Munir cannot perform the task that 
he has assigned himself-namely legally justifying the sovereignty of 
the President. If Munir really were within a legal system in which 
"the President's word is law" is the axiom, no justification of the 
President's authority would be possible or needed. He would show 
that the President's word is law precisely by not justifying the coup. 
Indeed Munir himself admits that a jurist must "presuppose," not 
justify, the ultimate constitution in his legal system.84 The very fact 
that Munir feels a need for justification means that this new legal 
system is not established. Munir, by trying to argue that the 
President's authority needs no justification, shows that it in fact 
does.85 
III. THIRD MISTAKE: INCORPORATING THE EXTRA-LEGAL INTO 
LEGAL AXIOMS 
Our first two mistakes involved the failure to recognize that 
axioms cannot be legally justified. The first mistake occurs when 
legal justifications are given for axioms (Amar) and the second occurs 
when the extra-legal explanations of these axioms are treated as if 
they were legal justifications (State v. Dosso ). But the confusion of 
the legal and the extra-legal can take more subtle forms. It is 
common for legal theorists to incorporate within the axiom of a legal 
84. Dosso, 1958 P.L.D. S. Ct. at 538. 
85. Munir's argument relied to a great extent on Kelsen. /d. at 539. Kelsen, it will be 
remembered, argued that the basic norm, which legally validates the first constitution of 
the system (that is, the axiom of the system), must be assumed by anyone who has 
knowledge of the laws of that system. See supra note 28. Furthermore, he admits that the 
basic norm will not be assumed unless the constitution is efficacious, in the sense that 
people abide by the laws that the constitution validates. PURE THEORY, supra note 16, at 
210 ("As soon as the old constitution loses its effectiveness and the new one has become 
effective, the acts that appear with the subjective meaning of creating or applying legal 
norms are no longer interpreted by presupposing the old basic norm, but by presupposing 
the new one."). But this does not mean that Kelsen understood efficacy as a legal 
justification of the validity of the constitution. It is an explanation of why the constitution 
is assumed to be valid, not a condition of its validity. See supra notes 54-58 and 
accompanying text; Green, supra note 21, at 401-02; Mahmud, supra note 73, at 110-13. 
Munir's misunderstanding of Kelsen is very common, for example, JULIUS STONE, LEGAL 
SYSTEM AND LAWYER'S REASONING 103-04 (1964), and has often been the source of 
inappropriate criticisms of Kelsen himself. R.W.M. DIAS, JURISPRUDENCE 413 (3d ed. 
1970); W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 285 (5th ed. 1967); Dhananjai Shivakumar, Note, 
The Pure Theory as Ideal Type: Defending Kelsen on the Basis of Weberian Methodology, 
105 YALE L.J. 1383, 1393 (1996). 
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system characteristics of its extra-legal explanation. This is the reason 
many come to the conclusion that sovereignty must be undivided and 
unlimited. John Austin, the nineteenth-century philosopher of law, 
will be my primary example of this third mistake concerning legal 
revolutions. 
A. Austin's Command Theory of Law 
In some respects Austin's philosophy of law looks very much like 
Hart's. Austin identifies a legal system extra-legally through a 
sovereign, understood as the person (or group of people) whose 
commands are habitually obeyed by the bulk of the population and 
who habitually obeys no one else.86 Where Hart looks for official 
practices, Austin looks for popular habits of obedience. The two also 
share a similar understanding of legal discontinuity. For Hart, 
discontinuity occurs when the rule of recognition changes.87 For 
Austin, it occurs when the bulk of a society changes its habits of 
obedience.88 
There is an important difference between Hart's approach and 
Austin's however. Although for Austin the sovereign plays an extra-
legal role in explaining the existence of a legal system, it is also the 
supreme lawmaker within the legal system it explains.89 Once there is 
a habit of obedience, the person to whom that obedience is given has 
supreme authority to make all law. 
For Hart, in contrast, the extra-legal explanation of a legal 
system is not required to play any particular legal role within the 
system. The participants in the rule of recognition are like Austinian 
86. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 193-94 (1954) 
(1832). 
87. See supra note 64. 
88. The following is Austin's account of Mexico's independence from Spain, formally 
recognized on September 27, 1821 in the Treaty of Cordoba: 
When did the revolted colony, which is now the Mexican nation, ascend from the 
condition of an insurgent province to that of an independent community? When 
did the body of colonists, who affected sovereignty in Mexico, change the 
character of rebel leaders for that of a supreme government? . . . Now the 
questions suggested above are equivalent to this: When had the inhabitants of 
Mexico obeyed that body so generally, and when had that general obedience 
become so frequent and lasting, that the bulk of the inhabitants of Mexico were 
habitually disobedient to Spain, and probably would not resume their discarded 
habit of submission? 
AUSTIN, supra note 86, at 206. 
89. !d. ("Every positive Jaw ... is set, directly or circuitously, by a sovereign person or 
body."). 
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sovereigns in an extra-legal sense, because they are responsible for 
bringing legal systems into being.90 But they are not Austinian 
sovereigns in the sense of having supreme legal authority to make all 
laws. Instead, the lawmaking role any person plays in the system is 
determined by the axiom the officials bring into being. If they create 
a direct democracy, they and the rest of the people in the society will 
jointly have supreme lawmaking authority. If they create an absolute 
monarchy, one person-who may or may not be one of them-will 
have supreme lawmaking authority. 
Because Austin's theory of sovereignty straddles the legal and 
the extra-legal, extra-legal concerns motivated him to put 
inappropriate legal restrictions upon the sovereign. For example, 
because the extra-legal explanation of a legal system is responsible for 
all laws within the system, including its axiom, Austin treats the 
sovereign as if it must command all laws within the system. This 
makes it impossible to explain an axiom that transcends and 
authorizes a succession of supreme lawmakers. Assume that Rex l's 
reign is followed by the reign of Rex II. If all valid laws must be 
traced to an individual sovereign, the change of monarchs must be 
understood as a revolution.91 See Figure L. 
90. See supra Section II.A. 
91. As Hart explains: 
Let us now suppose that, after a successful reign, Rex dies leaving a son Rex II 
who then starts to issue general orders. The mere fact that there was a general 
habit of obedience to Rex I in his lifetime does not by itself even render probable 
that Rex II will be habitually obeyed. Hence if we have nothing more to go on 
than the fact of obedience to Rex I and the likelihood that he would continue to be 
obeyed, we shall not be able to say of Rex Il's first order, as we could have said of 
Rex I's last order, that it was given by one who was a sovereign and therefore 
law .... Only after we know that his orders have been obeyed for some time shall 
we be able to say that a habit of obedience has been established. . . . Till this stage 
is reached there will be an interregnum in which no law can be made. 
HART, supra note 59, at 53. 
Hart makes its sound as if the problem is the empirical one of determining 
whether there will be obedience to Rex II simply because there was obedience to Rex l-
as if Hart's argument would be undermined by a showing that people are in fact quite 
likely to obey a son if they had obeyed the father. But let us say that there is such a 
showing. It would still follow that there was a revolution when we moved from the reign 
of Rex I to Rex II. Rex I's laws are valid by virtue of being Rex I's cqmmands, and Rex 
Il's laws are valid by virtue of being Rex Il's commands. The two systems of laws are 
discontinuous. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF LEGAL SYSTEM 34 (2d ed. 1980). 
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One might argue that legal continuity can be preserved if Rex I 
commanded obedience to Rex II upon his death. There would be 
legal continuity because only one sovereign in the Austinian sense 
(namely Rex I) exists. See Figure M. 
FigureM 
One problem with such an approach is explaining how the authority 
of a current sovereign could fundamentally depend upon a habit of 
obedience to a dead one.92 But the real problem is far more 
fundamental. It is not just that Austin cannot exclude the possibility 
of a revolution between the reigns of Rex I and Rex II; he cannot 
exclude the possibility of a revolution between each of Rex I's 
commands. Because all law has its source in the command of the 
sovereign, there is no place for the axiom of the legal system that 
92. HART, supra note 59, at 62. A habit of obedience is confirmed by sensitivity to 
changes of command. Since the commands of a dead sovereign may not change, it is hard 
to see how we can know that there is a habit of obedience at all. Furthermore, in some 
cases the identity of the Austinian sovereign would be forgotten. It is odd to be in a habit 
of obeying someone unknown. 
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authorizes Rex I himself to make law. There is no sense in which 
"Rex I's word is law" is itself law. When asked why what Rex I says 
is law, the participants in the legal system would apparently have no 
answer. If there is no legal rule authorizing Rex I to make law, there 
is no reason not to consider each command issued by Rex I as 
independent-its own momentary legal system-such that revolution 
happens constantly. 
To unify all the commands of Rex I into the same legal system, 
an authorization of Rex I to make law-an axiom to the legal 
system-is needed. This axiom cannot be commanded by a lawmaker 
within the system-even the supreme lawmaker. To say that the 
axiom cannot emanate from the supreme lawmaker is simply another 
way of saying that it cannot be legally justified-it can only be extra-
legally explained. 
Furthermore once it is conceded that Rex I's authority to make 
law has an extra-legal explanation in something outside of his own 
commands, the possibility opens up of an even more comprehensive 
axiom that allows the reigns of Rex I and Rex II to be contained 
within the same legal system. See Figure N. 
Figure N 
B. Austin on Limited Sovereignty 
The confusion of the legal and the extra-legal also stands behind 
Austin's arguments that the sovereign must have unlimited 
authority.93 Austin admitted that the sovereign could defer to the 
93. AUSTIN, supra note 86, at 254 ("[T]he power of a sovereign number in its 
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opinions of other sovereigns or its own population.94 Nevertheless, it 
was legally unlimited in the sense that it was subject to no law.95 
Austin is correct that the extra-legal explanation of a legal system 
is legally unlimited. All law, even the axiom of the system, is 
whatever this extra-legal explanation "says" it is. For example, 
assume that three federal district court judges decide that the U.S. 
Constitution was a mistake. They draft a new constitution in which 
legislative authority rests in a new collective body and executive 
authority in the majority leader of that body. They then fill the body 
with their friends. From that moment forward, these three judges 
follow the new constitution, adjudicating cases in accordance with the 
laws generated by the new body. 
The judges in this example are clearly acting illegally. Assume, 
however, that the new constitution catches on. Eventually all judges, 
as well as the other participants in the American rule of recognition, 
start following it. No one asks for, or feels the need to give, a legal 
justification for the new constitution. It is now the axiom of a new 
legal system. At this point the three judges, with all the other 
participants in the American rule of recognition, are no longer acting 
illegally, because they have generated a new rule under which their 
actions are legal. The law is, in a sense, whatever they "say" it is. 
They appear to have precisely that limitless lawmaking power that 
Austin attributes to the sovereign. 
But these participants are not the supreme lawmakers within the 
system they create. The new body is. Furthermore, precisely because 
they have the unlimited ability to generate any legal system at all, 
there is no reason they cannot generate one in which the supreme 
lawmaker has limited authorization to create law. If the law is 
whatever they "say" it is, what reason is there to believe that they 
cannot say that the body can make laws only concerning peanuts and 
that all non-peanut laws are void? The body would be the supreme 
lawmaker in the sense that all valid laws can be traced back to its 
commands. But it would be extremely limited in the types of laws it 
may enact. 
Austin argues that the sovereign's lawmaking power must be 
unlimited because any limits would have to be understood as the 
collegiate and sovereign capacity, is incapable of legal limitation."). This tradition goes 
back at least as far as Thomas Hobbes. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 213-15 (M. 
Oakeshott ed., 1946) (1651). 
94. AUSTIN, supra note 86, at 214. 
95. /d. at 254. 
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commands of a higher sovereign.96 To make every sovereign limited, 
one would need an infinite chain of sovereigns, each limiting the one 
below it, which Austin rightly calls "impossible and absurd. "97 He 
ignores, however, the fact that the source of these limits could be 
extra-legal. After all, even if the legal system has an unlimited 
sovereign, there will eventually have to be an extra-legal explanation 
of who that person is-why one person rather than another is the one 
with that power. That a particular person is the unlimited sovereign 
could never be justified in terms of the command of a higher 
sovereign, on pain of generating an infinite regress. If we must rely 
upon the extra-legal to explain unlimited sovereignty, why not rely 
upon it to explain the limited variety? 
But what happens if the limited sovereign acts in a manner that it 
believes is within these limits but others disagree?98 Is not a 
lawmaker needed to resolve the disagreement? And must not this 
sovereign be unlimited, since it would have the final say about what 
any limitation is? Its limits would be whatever it said they were, 
which is to say it has no limits at all. 
Although such arguments are common,99 they make unlimited 
sovereignty just as impossible as limited sovereignty. Let us assume 
that Rex claims to be the unlimited sovereign but other people 
disagree, claiming that Roi is. If we need an unlimited sovereign to 
resolve the disagreement, unlimited sovereignty is impossible. For 
the disagreement is precisely about who this unlimited sovereign is. 
Those who appeal to an unlimited sovereign to resolve 
disagreement about limitations on sovereignty simply assume that 
significant disagreement does not arise concerning that unlimited 
sovereign's status. But the same assumption should be available to 
the advocate of limited sovereignty. If the acceptance of the limits on 
Rex's sovereignty is as strong as the acceptance that he is the 
sovereign, then his sovereignty will be limited. Although there will be 
no authority to answer disagreements about his limits, the level of 
agreement that makes this unproblematic is precisely why his 
96. W.J. Rees, The Theory of Sovereignty Restated, 59 MIND 495, 518 {1950) {"All 
political theorists have found it logically necessary, therefore, either to deny the existence 
of legal duties on the part of the government so as to be able to maintain its legal 
sovereignty ... or else to deny its legal sovereignty in order to assert its legal duties .... "). 
See AUSTIN, supra note 86, at 254. 
97. AUSTIN, supra note 86, at 254. 
98. See Amar, Sovereignty, supra note 36, at 1430, 1435 {1987). 
99. See RAZ, supra note 17, at 30-33. 
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sovereignty is limited.100 
In short, for the axiom of the legal system to be "whatever Rex 
says is law, provided it concerns peanuts," it must be the case that 
officials will simply accept the axiom without further legal 
justification. This acceptance will manifest itself in their treating 
Rex's non-peanut "laws" as legal nullities, without referring the 
question to Rex or to another lawmaker. These "laws" will be 
treated with the same indifference as the "laws" issued by a madman 
who claims to be King or by any other illegitimate pretender to the 
throne. 
The possibility of genuinely limited sovereignty is crucial to 
making sense of entrenched (that is, unamendable) provisions within 
constitutions. An example of such a provision is Article 79(3) of the 
German constitution (or Grundgesetz). 101 Article 79(3) prohibits 
amendments changing the basic principles laid down in Articles 1 and 
20. 102 On the one hand, the limitations in Article 79(3) can be 
understood as not limiting the sovereign at all. Instead, they could be 
the creation of the unlimited sovereign who commanded the 
constitution as a whole, including Article 79(3). This sovereign would 
apparently be the representative assemblies of two-thirds of the 
German Lander, which ratified the Grundgesetz. 103 If this sovereign 
were to choose a new constitution that rejected the principles in 
Articles 1 and 20, there would be no revolutionary change of legal 
system. 
But the extra-legal evidence might show that these limitations 
were actually part of the axiom empowering the representative 
assemblies of the Lander to create the constitution in the first place. 
Article 79(3), rather than being an act of lawmaking by the sovereign, 
would instead be the exemplification of the axiomatic status of the 
limitation for those reasoning within the legal system. This would be 
true if any constitution enacted by the representative assemblies that 
violated the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 would have been 
treated by officials as void. If the assemblies later enacted a 
100. See Thomas Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, 103 ETHICS 48, 59-61 
(1992). 
101. See ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 6-16,32-33, 35-36. 
102. GRUNDGESETZ [GGJ [Constitution], art. 79(3) (F.R.G.). Article 1 protects 
human dignity, and Article 20 protects the state order, including democracy and the 
separation of powers, as well as the right to resist any person seeking to abolish the 
constitutional order. Cf U.S. CONST. art. V (forbidding amendments that prohibit the 
importation of slaves until 1808 or that deprive a state of equal suffrage in the Senate 
without its consent). 
103. GRUNDGESETZ [GGJ [Constitution], art. 144 (F.R.G.). 
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constitution violating the principles and the constitution was accepted 
as law, a revolution would have occurred. 
C. Austin (and A mar) on Divided Sovereignty 
Austin's confusion of the legal and the extra-legal also stands 
behind his demand that the sovereign be undivided. Although he 
admitted that some sovereigns, such as the King-in-Parliament, are 
composite,104 he insisted that even a composite sovereign was 
nevertheless unitary-the composite, acting together, was sole 
determiner of the law.105 Chains of legal validity, Austin argued, must 
always lead to a single lawmaker.106 It cannot be the case that one 
lawmaker has final say about one area of the law and another has 
final say about another area.107 
Once again, the primary argument against divided sovereignty is 
that disagreements about the division of lawmaking powers could 
arise.108 These disagreements, it is assumed, would have to be 
answered by a unitary sovereign. But that unitary sovereign could 
have this status only on the assumption that there are no serious 
disagreements about its lawmaking power. By the same token, 
divided sovereignty should be able to exist, provided that there are no 
serious disagreements about the divisions of lawmaking power.109 
Indeed, one must believe in the possibility of divided sovereignty 
to the extent that one believes that a succession of lawmakers is 
possible within the same legal system. This is sovereignty divided 
over time. Rex II is able to become King after Rex I (without 
revolution) only because there is no serious disagreement about the 
temporal division of authority within the system. While Rex I is King, 
officials do not accept Rex II's commands as law. When Rex II 
becomes King, officials do not accept Rex I's old commands as law 
(for example when they conflict with Rex Il's commands). 
The same thing should be possible concerning division of 
supreme lawmaking authority at the same moment in time. Assume 
104. He even went so far as to argue that the sovereign of the United States was an 
aggregate body consisting of the joint action of the bodies of each of the states' citizens. 
JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 209 (Wilfried E. 
Rumble ed., Cambridge University Press 1995). 
105. ld. at 205. 
106. ld. 
107. ld. ("(U]nless the sovereign be one individual, or one body of individuals, the 
given independent society is either in a state of nature, or is split into two or more 
independent political societies."). 
108. See RAZ, supra note 17, at 35-38. 
109. See Pogge, supra note 100, at 59-61. 
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that Blue Rex is the supreme lawmaker about issues having only a 
domestic element, and Red Rex is the supreme lawmaker about 
issues having an international element. Neither Blue Rex nor Red 
Rex may overrule the decision of the other. Provided that 
disagreements about the division of authority between Blue Rex and 
Red Rex concerning subject matter are as rare as disagreements 
about the temporal division of authority between Rex I and Rex II, 
then the former division of sovereignty is as real as the latter. 
Disagreement may be more likely concerning sovereignty divided 
by subject matter than it is concerning sovereignty divided over time. 
But saying that divided (or limited) sovereignty is difficult to sustain 
is a far cry from saying it is impossible. Furthermore, we can only 
determine the extent to which this form of sovereignty exists by 
examining legal systems in an unbiased fashion. That someone has 
yet to find examples of divided or limited sovereignty means nothing 
if she has examined legal systems with the a priori belief that they are 
impossible. 
The belief that divided and limited sovereignty are impossible is 
the result of the confusion of the legal and the extra-legal. In any 
legal system, an unlimited and undivided source of law remains in the 
background-namely the extra-legal explanation of the legal system 
itself. The officials who practice the rule of recognition that brings 
the system into being will be unlimited, in the sense that they can 
generate any axiom they want. They will also be undivided, in the 
sense that only they, acting together in a practice, can create the 
system. If their practice is divided, there will be two legal systems. 
This does not mean, however, that some unlimited and undivided 
sovereign must exist within the system they create. 
Amar shares Austin's view that sovereignty must be undivided. 110 
Ratification of the Constitution, he argues, could not generate a legal 
system in which sovereignty was shared between the states and the 
federal government.111 Either the peoples of the states retained their 
pre-ratification sovereignty and each state people can unilaterally 
secede simply by choosing to make the Constitution void in their legal 
system or the people of the United States became sovereign and all 
110. Amar, Consent, supra note 15, at 457, 506 (endorsing Founder James Wilson's 
view that sovereignty is absolute and indivisible). Amar also argues that the Founders-
Madison excepted-rejected divided sovereignty. Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 15, at 
1063 (citing Amar, Sovereignty, supra note 36, at 1435 n.40, 1452 n.113) (discussing 
Founders' almost universal rejection of dual sovereignty). 
111. See Amar, Consent, supra note 15, at 457, 506; Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 15, 
at 1062-Q3; Amar, Sovereignty, supra note 36, at 1465-Q6. 
HeinOnline -- 83 N.C. L. Rev. 374 2004-2005
374 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
power that the states possess is delegated from this unitary people.112 
But there is no reason to believe that in the United States 
sovereignty is not shared with the states, in the sense that state 
governments (or their peoples) are the supreme sources of law in 
some areas. All that is needed is extra-legal evidence of an accepted 
division of lawmaking authority that is not itself justified by reference 
to a higher authority. If state authority to make law is granted by 
federal law, then Amar would be right that there is only one federal 
sovereign. But these two bodies of law can have independent and 
coexisting sources.113 
If sovereignty is divided, the states would have no legal power to 
unilaterally secede from the Union simply by declaring the 
Constitution void. If they could secede at all, it would be only with 
the consent of the federal sovereign. But because the states are also 
sovereign with respect to state law, the federal sovereign would not 
be the only final determiner of valid law. 
IV. FOURTH MISTAKE: INCORPORATING POLITICAL SELF-IMAGE 
INTO LEGAL AXIOMS 
In this Article, I have assumed that Article VII is the axiom of 
the American legal system. In fact, since sovereignty may be divided, 
Article VII would probably be only part of that axiom. State laws 
within our legal system would have their source in different 
sovereigns, which would have to be mentioned in any complete 
articulation of the axiom of our legal system. But for the rest of this 
Article, we can ignore this wrinkle. 
If Article VII is the axiom of our legal system, the sovereign 
within our system is the conventions of the thirteen original states (or, 
perhaps, their peoples). This entity had the ultimate lawmaking 
112. See Amar, Consent, supra note 15, at 457, 506; Amar, Sovereignty, supra note 36, 
at 1465-66; Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 15, at 1062-{:;3. 
113. Cf U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thorton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) ("The Framers split the atom of sovereignty. . . . The resulting Constitution 
created a legal system unprecedented in form and design, establishing two orders of 
government, each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual 
rights and obligations to the people who sustain it" and are governed by it.") ; New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (" 'The Constitution ... leaves to the several States 
a residuary and inviolable sovereignty . .. reserved explicitly to the States by the Tenth 
Amendment.'") (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39, 245 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)). Of 
course, if there is indeed divided sovereignty in the United States, it . cannot be legally 
justified, either by reference to the Constitution (for example, the Tenth Amendment) or 
Supreme Court decisions, without undermining that division of sovereignty itself. The 
previous citations must be understood as extra-legal evidence only. 
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power, through ratification by at least nine of its constituents, to enact 
the Constitution as valid law for the ratifying statesY4 All valid law 
can be traced back to this decision by the sovereign. Had it decided 
not to ratify, everything we currently take to be the law of the United 
States would be invalid. 
But, as we shall see, this conception of our sovereign fits poorly 
with popular view that in the United States the people are sovereign. 
This is true even if we assume that the conventions of the original 
thirteen states expressed the majority wills of the peoples of those 
states. The tension between the structure of our legal system and our 
political self-image can lead to our fourth mistake concerning legal 
revolutions, in which the axiom of a legal system is distorted to 
accommodate this self-image. My example of this mistake is, once 
again, the writings of Akhil Amar. In Amar's case, the fourth 
mistake causes him to see legal continuity where there is actually 
revolution. 
A. In the United States, the People Are Not Sovereign 
The Article VII sovereign diverges from our political self-image 
in at least four respects. First of all, even if it is admitted that 
sovereignty may be limited, a popular sovereign is usually understood 
as having at least significant discretion concerning the content of laws 
that it may enact. In contrast, the Article VII sovereign has no choice 
about the content of the law it may enact, since its content is fully 
specified in the axiom of the legal system. The sovereign's only 
lawmaking power is enacting or refusing to enact a particular 
constitution.115 
Second, a popular sovereign is usually understood as having the 
power to rescind any laws that it has enacted.116 In contrast, the 
Article VII sovereign's decision is eternal and irrevocable. If the 
constitution is enacted, it will be the Constitution forever. No new 
constitution can be created to replace it, because Article VII makes 
no provisions for such a replacement, even by the Article VII 
sovereign itself.117 The only legal means of constitutional change is 
through the Article V amendment procedures identified within the 
eternal constitution. If a truly new constitution came into being, it 
114. U.S. CONST. art. VII. 
115. See Greenawalt, supra note 68, at 639-40 (arguing that the fact that Article VII is 
tied to a particular constitution makes it unlikely as an identification of the sovereign). 
116. See id. (arguing that the "one time only" character of Article VII makes it unlikely 
as the identification of the sovereign). 
117. U.S. CONST. art. VII. 
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could only be the result of a revolution. 
One might think that there can be no eternal constitution if 
everything that the Article VII sovereign enacted can be amended 
away through Article V procedures. Indeed, for just this reason, it 
seems that the true sovereign within our legal system is the lawmaker 
identified in Article V, since it is that lawmaker that has the final say 
about what is or is not in the Constitution.U8 
But the Article V amendment process does not mean that there 
is no eternal constitution. This is easiest to see if one assumes that 
Article V cannot amend itself, that is, that Article V procedures 
cannot be used to change the procedures for amending the 
Constitution.119 If so, the eternal constitution must include at least 
Article V itself. The decision of the Article VII lawmaker to enact 
Article V put an eternal limit on subsequent participants in the 
American legal system. No constitutional change is possible except 
through Article V procedures, no matter what the Article V 
lawmaker itself says. Furthermore, Article V cannot be changed even 
by the Article VII sovereign. If the conventions of the thirteen 
original states (or indeed all fifty states) subsequently voted to amend 
Article V, this could be considered valid only on the assumption that 
a revolution had occurred. The amendment could not be validated by 
reference to Article V since Article V may not amend itself. And it 
could not be validated by reference to Article VII, for that allows the 
state conventions to enact only the Constitution (in which Article V 
occurs). 
But even if one assumes that self-amendment of Article V is 
possible, an eternal core would still remain. Granted, Article V 
would not be that eternal core. If Article V procedures were used to 
amend Article V, any subsequent amendment of the Constitution 
would proceed through the amended, not the original, Article V 
procedures. And the amended Article V would not be eternal either. 
If this amended Article V were itself amended, then any subsequent 
amendment of the Constitution would have to proceed through the 
twice-amended Article V procedures. But the fact remains that 
however many amendments of the amendment procedures occur, any 
amendment of the Constitution, including of the amendment 
procedures themselves, is valid only if the procedures by which the 
118. See AUSTIN, supra note 86, at 204-05. Cf Alf Ross, On Self-Reference and a 
Puzzle in Constitutional Law, 78 MIND 1, 3-7 {1969) {arguing that the highest authority in 
a legal system is the body with the power to amend the constitution). 
119. See infra Sections V.A-B. 
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amendment was effectuated can be traced back through a series of 
path-dependently valid amendments that ultimately begins with the 
original Article V procedures. This is a requirement in the legal 
system that no lawmaker can change, including the Article VII 
sovereign. It is the eternal constitution that can be altered only 
through revolution. 
In contrast to Article VII, the American axiom as Amar 
understands it gives the sovereign of our system the discretion to 
create any constitution it wishes, and to rescind a constitution at 
will.12° For Amar, the people of the United States, through a simple 
vote, can create a constitution that is utterly different from our 
current one.121 There is no eternal constitution within our system. To 
be sure, the axiom of the system is eternal. As long as we remain in 
the American legal system as Amar understands it, the people will be 
sovereign.122 This is something over which, as we shall see in Part V, 
even the people have no legal control. But the Article VII sovereign 
was not merely unable to change the axiom of its legal system. In 
addition, the axiom gave it no choice about the constitution that it 
could create. And Amar's sovereign is not restricted in this fashion.123 
A third divergence from our political self-image is that a popular 
sovereign is usually· understood as being alive, whereas the Article 
VII sovereign is dead. The conventions of the states referred to in 
Article VII are the conventions at the time of the ratification, not any 
conventions that might subsequently be created. Of course, this is not 
surprising, since the sole lawmaking decision entrusted to that 
sovereign has already been made and is irrevocable. 
Once again, Amar's approach is more in keeping with our 
political self-image. The living people of the United States are the 
ultimate source of valid law.124 It is precisely for this reason that 
Amar insists that Article V cannot be the sole method of 
constitutional change.125 This would be incompatible with the 
sovereignty of the living, since Article V's restrictions can keep an 
amendment from being enacted even if the majority of those living in 
the United States-or, indeed, the majority of those living in a 
120. Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 15, at 1044-45. 
121. /d. 
122. See infra Section V.C. 
123. Amar, Sovereignty, supra note 36, at 1434-35 (arguing that American sovereign is 
unlimited). 
124. /d. at 1072. 
125. /d. at1054-57, 1063. 
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particular state-wanted it.126 No living people would have ultimate 
control over the law that binds them. 
Furthermore, popular sovereignty is commonly understood as 
encompassing all the people. But if Article VII is the axiom of our 
legal system, the conventions (or peoples) of the thirty-seven non-
ratifying states are not constituents of this sovereign. Although 
American laws are valid within New Hampshire in a way that can be 
traced back ultimately to a decision of the people of New Hampshire 
(albeit the dead people of that state), American laws are valid in, say, 
Hawaii in a way that cannot be traced back to a decision of the people 
of Hawaii, living or dead. Although Hawaii voted to become a state 
in 1959, as a condition for statehood under the Hawaii Admission 
Act,127 all that is required for the admission of a state under Article 
IV, section 3 is congressional consent-not the consent of the new 
state itself. 128 And since the requirements of Article IV, section 3 
derive ultimately from the conventions of the original thirteen states, 
the constitutional rights and obligations of Hawaiians derive from the 
choices made by foreigners. 
In any event, refusing statehood would not have removed Hawaii 
from the American legal system as long as it remained a territory.129 
And Hawaii was made a territory of the United States without the 
consent of the people of Hawaii. American annexation in 1898 was 
negotiated with the consent of the Republic of Hawaii,130 an oligarchy 
of pro-annexationist Americans that had overthrown the Hawaiian 
126. !d. at 1062-63. 
127. See An Act to Provide for the Admission of the State of Hawaii into the Union, 
Pub. L. 86-3, § 7, 73 Stat. 4, 7 (1959). In addition, the Territorial Legislature petitioned 
Congress for statehood in 1903 and Hawaii voted to join the union by plebiscite in 1940. 
RICH BUDNICK, STOLEN KINGDOM: AN AMERICAN CONSPIRACY 188-90 (Aloha Press 
1992). Hawaii's admission, like the admission of other states, was in accordance with the 
congressional practice, which may also be constitutionally required , of admitting states on 
an "equal footing" with the original thirteen colonies. See State Land Bd. v. Corvallis 
Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 370, 373 (1977) (quoting Mumford v. Wardwell, 73 U.S. 
(6 Wall.) 423, 436 (1867)); Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 563-69, 576-77, 579 (1911); 
Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 224 (1845). The equal footing doctrine is 
a misnomer, however. The admitted states are not given the option, which was given to 
the original states, of refusing obligations under American law entirely. See infra notes 
128-39 and accompanying text. 
128. U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ 3. 
129. See Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, David Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 , 542-
43 (1828). 
130. See Joint Resolution to Provide for Annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United 
States, 30 Stat. 750, 55 Pub. Res. 55 (July 7, 1898). Consent was through the Senate of 
Hawaii. 
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Kingdom under Queen Lili'uokalani, by force, in 1893.131 
Since Hawaii was an independent nation with diplomatic 
relations, including relations with the United States, prior to 
annexation, it is a particularly vivid example.132 But it is not at all 
exceptional. The same could be said of the people of any of the other 
thirty-six non-ratifying states. The Louisiana Purchase, for example, 
did not involve the consent of those people, even those white people, 
who became subject to American laws as a result of the purchase.133 
As John Quincy Adams rightly put it, the Louisiana Treaty created 
"despotic powers over the territories purchased."134 
It is true that Article V procedures give the people of Hawaii or 
Missouri the ability to participate in constitutional change. But it 
cannot put them on an equal footing with people of the thirteen 
original states, since Article V does not give the people of Hawaii or 
Missouri a unilateral right to block amendments to the Constitution. 
Under Article VII, the dead people of New Hampshire had the 
option of avoiding obligations under the Constitution (such as their 
obligations under the Commerce Clause) by refusing to ratify the 
Constitution. In contrast, the people of Hawaii or Missouri can avoid 
their obligations under the Commerce Clause only if they can first 
convince the legislatures or conventions of thirty-seven other states to 
repeal it. 
The tension between our political self-image and the sovereignty 
of the Article VII lawmaker makes it tempting to argue that the 
axiom of our legal system must be something other than Article VII, 
that legal justifications must end with a higher legal principle that 
gives the ultimate choice of legal validity to the people who currently 
131. Jennifer M.L. Chock, One Hundred Years of Illegitimacy: International Legal 
Analysis of the Illegal Overthrow of the Hawaiian Monarchy, Hawai'i's Annexation, and 
Possible Reparations, 17 U. HAW. L. REV. 463, 465-{56 (1995); Lisa Cami Oshiro, 
Comment, Recognizing Na Kanaka Maoli's Right to Self-Determination, 25 N.M. L. REV. 
65, 70-74 (1995). 
132. See Chock, supra note 131, at 463-64; Oshiro, supra note 131, at 66-70. 
133. See Treaty for the Cession of Louisiana, 8 Stat. 200, TS 86 (Apr. 30, 1803) (not 
conditioning the agreement on the consent of any of the citizens of the territory). 
134. 5 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 401 (Charles Francis Adams ed., AMS 
Press 1970) (1874-1877). The primary worry about the constitutionality of the Louisiana 
Purchase, however, did not have to do with the absence of consent of the inhabitants of 
the territories themselves, but the fact that national government could affect the interests 
of the current states, especially by generating new states, without the current states' 
consent. Jefferson and Adams both worried that a constitutional amendment might be 
necessary to make the purchase legitimate. See Robert Knowles, The Balance of Forces 
and the Empire of Liberty: States' Rights and the Louisiana Purchase, 88 IOWA L. REV. 
343, 346 (2003). 
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live in the entire United States. But this temptation should be 
resisted. By giving in to it, we will lose sight of the legal system we 
currently inhabit. This is the fourth mistake concerning legal 
revolutions. 
B. Amar Forces Us To Be Free 
Amar's account of the American sovereign is an example of this 
mistake.135 The sovereignty of the dead, he argues, is contrary to our 
democratic traditionsY6 The living must rule. This motivates him to 
look behind the lawmakers identified in Article VII for an enduring 
sovereign-the people of the United States.137 Because this 
sovereign, unlike that identified in Article VII, is alive, it can bypass 
Article V procedures for amendment, without a revolutionary break 
in legal continuity, simply by creating a new constitution.138 
But Amar is not uncovering the structure of our legal system. 
We do not currently inhabit a system in which the ultimate source of 
legal validity is the people of the United States. The evidence for this 
is the fact that Amar's argument that the Constitution can be 
amended through a simple majority vote was greeted, and is still 
greeted, with an extreme skepticism that Amar himself 
acknowledges.139 
Amar's response to the skeptics is that they "suffer from 
remarkable amnesia concerning the Constitution's words and 
deeds. "140 The forgotten history of the Founding shows that the 
people are sovereign. But how can the views of people two centuries 
ago determine what legal system we currently inhabit? Even if Amar 
had succeeded in showing that the people were accepted as sovereign 
during the Founding, that does not mean that we currently inhabit 
such a legal system. All Amar would have done is show is that we 
135. Cf. David R. Dow, When Words Mean What We Believe They Say: The Case of 
Article V, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1, 30-35 (1990) (arguing that Amar's popular vote theory is 
not based on the constitution but is rather an esoteric notion and is irrelevant to 
constitutional interpretation); Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original 
Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 165-76 (1996) 
(arguing that constitutional amendment by a simple majority was not what the Framers 
intended and that it would be a "bad" development). 
136. Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 15, at 1072-75. 
137. See Amar, Sovereignty, supra note 36, at 1427. 
138. See Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 15, at 1044. 
139. See DAVID R. DOW, The Plain Meaning of Article V, in RESPONDING TO 
IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 117, 
123-24, 136-42 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995); Dow, supra note 135; Charles Fried, 
Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13,29-33 (1995); Monaghan, supra note 135. 
140. Amar, Consent, supra note 15, at 497. 
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have undergone a revolution since that time. The ultimate standard 
of legal validity used to be the people of the United States. In the 
past, circumvention of Article V by a popular vote would have been 
viewed as non-revolutionary. Now, due to the very amnesia that 
Amar identifies, the ultimate standard of legal validity is the dead 
peoples of the thirteen original states. 
Indeed, there is an irony to Amar's appeal to history. On the 
one hand, by making the enduring people sovereign, Amar seeks to 
"cast[ ] off the dead hand of the past."141 If decisions made by the 
dead could legally bind us-we would lose our democratic 
credentials. But by freeing us from the sovereignty of the past as a 
legal matter, Amar has bound us to the past extra-legally. Why are we 
in a legal system in which we are free of the sovereignty of the past? 
Because of views that people had over two centuries ago. It does not 
matter, Amar argues, that we refuse to recognize ourselves as 
sovereign.142 The dead hand of the past makes us so. 
Amar's appeal to the past is also selective. If he is allowed to 
ignore our current beliefs when determining what legal system we 
inhabit, why is he so willing to look to the beliefs the Founders had 
when determining what legal system they inhabited? Why not worry 
about whether they suffered from "remarkable amnesia" concerning 
the ultimate sovereignty of the King-in-Parliament? 
Amar is an example of why the distortion of our legal system to 
fit our political self-image should be resisted. If we succumb to the 
temptation to view our legal system in the light of our political ideals, 
all that will happen is that our view of our own legal system will be 
obscured. We will begin treating as law positions that are not in fact 
valid within our legal system. We will see legal continuity where 
there is actually revolution. 
It is worth noting that there is another very different reason that 
Amar might believe that the people of the United States are 
sovereign. He might think that the existence of a rule of recognition 
depends, not upon officialdom (as Hart does143), but upon the 
population as a whole. If so, then, in a sense, the law would be 
whatever the people "say" it is, just as for Hart the law is whatever 
officialdom "says" it is. 
141. See Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 15, at 1072. 
142. See Fried, supra note 139, at 31; Lawrence Lessig, What Drives Derivability: 
Responses to Responding to Imperfection, 74 TEX. L. REV. 839, 853-57 (1996). 
143. See supra Section II.A. 
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But, as we have seen/44 identifying the community at the basis of 
the rule of recognition is very different from identifying the sovereign 
within the legal system created by thatrule of recognition. Assume 
that it was the French people-not French officials-who generated 
the rule of recognition in which Louis XVI's word was law. It would 
not follow that France before the Revolution was really a democracy 
or that the French Revolution, far from being revolutionary, merely 
involved the people of France changing the body to whom they 
delegated their power from Louis to the National Assembly. 
If the people are the community standing behind the rule of 
recognition, then the sovereign is whatever the people accept, without 
justification, as the ultimate lawmaker. If they accept Louis, then 
they have generated an absolute monarchy. If they accept 
themselves, then they have generated a democracy. Accordingly one 
does not know who the sovereign in our system is simply by being 
told that the people are the community establishing our rule of 
recognition. And one does not know that there is legal continuity 
simply by being told that there is continuity to this community. 
V. FIFTH MISTAKE: SELF-AUTHORIZATION AND SELF-LIMITATION 
OF AUTHORITY 
I have argued that legal systems are identified by axioms that are 
not themselves legally justified. If the axiom of the American legal 
system is Article VII, then the Constitutional Convention was not an 
authorized lawmaking body when it created Article VII. But why not 
say that Article VII authorized itself, because it was ratified according 
to its own procedures? After all, Article VII is, at least formally, part 
of the Constitution, and the Constitution was ratified by the 
conventions of at least nine states.145 See Figure 0. 
144. See supra Section II.A-B. 
145. Joseph Raz argues that laws may, through a loop, indirectly authorize their own 
creation, but he admits that the validity of the laws within the loop "can be proved only if, 
in the last resort, the validity of one of the laws is assumed and not proved." RAZ, supra 
note 17, at 139. 
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Figure 0 
A good deal rides on this question, because if a sovereign could 
authorize the very axiom that gives it authority, then it should also be 
able to refuse to authorize it or refuse to authorize it fully, thereby 
terminating or limiting its authority. And if that is possible, then 
revolutions may be far less common than has been supposed. 
Consider Louis XVI's relationship to the National Assembly in 
August of 1789. At that time the King was a limited monarch, in the 
sense that he could not revoke the National Assembly's lawmaking 
power. We treated this as a reason to conclude that a revolution had 
occurred. The sovereignty of the King was replaced, through extra-
legal means, by the sovereignty of the National Assembly. But if the 
King could have used his absolute authority to irrevocably delegate 
his authority to the National Assembly, then a revolution may not 
have occurred after all. 
Indeed, there may be no reason to conclude that the American 
Revolution really occurred. It is true that, at one point, valid laws 
were traceable back to the King-in-Parliament146 and, at another 
point, the colonies were "Free and Independent States" with the "full 
146. The sovereignty of the King-in-Parliament was challenged from the American 
perspective before the Revolution. See, e.g., JACK P. GREENE, PERIPHERIES AND 
CENTER: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE EXTENDED POLITIES OF THE 
BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE UNITED STATES, 1607-1788, at 66-68 (1986) (describing 
Benjamin Franklin's questioning of the authority of Parliament over the colonies). 
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Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish 
Commerce, and do all other Acts and Things which Independent 
States may of right do."147 But in the Treaty of Paris of 1783, Great 
Britain recognized the thirteen colonies as "free, sovereign and 
independent States. "148 Of course, Americans are disinclined to 
understand their laws as valid only because of the Treaty of Paris. 
But maybe this is because of the worry that if American laws had 
such a source, they could be revoked by the King-in-Parliament. And 
once we realize that the King-in-Parliament could have irrevocably 
delegated its absolute authority, we might be less inclined to think 
that the American Revolution happened after all. 
A. Self-limitation as Revolution 
In order to determine the possibility of a sovereign legally 
changing the very axiom that gives it authority, it is crucial to 
distinguish such an event from revolution. Although Louis XVI's 
recognition of the Declaration of the Rights of Man might be 
understood as legally validating the Declaration, it can also be 
understood as the simple acknowledgement that a revolution had 
occurred. Indeed, even if one assumed that the Declaration was not 
valid until after the King's recognition, it does not yet follow that 
Louis XVI was legally responsible for the Declaration's validity. The 
King's utterance of the words "I recognize the Declaration" could 
have motivated officials, who formerly looked to the King as the 
ultimate source of law, to look to the National Assembly. This 
utterance would have been no different from any of the other ways 
that the King could cause a change in rules of recognition, for 
example, by vigorously picking his nose in public. Observing his 
nose-picking, officials might lose so much respect for Louis that they 
begin looking to the National Assembly as the ultimate lawmaker. 
But that would not mean that the King legally self-limited his 
authority by picking his nose. 
For Louis to have limited his authority in a non-revolutionary 
fashion, the pre- and post-recognition legal systems must have been 
the same. But that makes it hard to see how the King's recognition 
could possibly have bound him. If officials retained the practice of 
looking to the King as the ultimate source of law, they would have 
followed his command if he revoked the Declaration and with it the 
147. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 35 (U.S. 1776). 
148. Definitive Treaty of Peace, Sept. 3, 1783, art. I, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 8 Stat. 80, 81 
(known as the "Treaty of Paris."). 
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National Assembly's power. France would have remained an 
absolute monarchy.149 
We appear to be driven to the position that Louis's recognition, 
and all other acts of self-limitation of authority, must be either 
revocable or revolutionary. There is a problem with this conclusion 
however. Consider amendment provisions within constitutions, such 
as Article V. Since these provisions create lawmaking authorities, 
their self-amendment (for example, the use of Article V procedures 
to amend Article V itself) would appear to be the self-limitation of 
authority. And if the amended rather than the original amendment 
procedures must be used to rescind the self-amendment, this self-
limitation would be binding-something we have concluded is 
revolutionary. 150 The revolution would be no less real because the 
self-limitation was accomplished by a subsidiary authority within the 
legal system. 
That binding self-amendment of amendment clauses must be 
understood as revolutionary would not be a problem in itself if it were 
rare. But amendment provisions (although not Article V itself151) are 
commonly amended by their own procedures in a way that is taken to 
be binding and non-revolutionary.152 
149. Ross, supra note 118, at 6. 
150. /d. Ross used as his example the Article 88 of the Danish Constitution. 
151. But even with Article V, there have been attempts. See PETER SUBER, THE 
PARADOX OF SELF AMENDMENT, Appendix I (1990). In only one case was the self-
amendment actually passed by two-thirds of each house of Congress, qualifying it to be 
submitted to the states. This was the Corwin Amendment, which, in a last-minute attempt 
to avert the Civil War, would have forbad amendments to the Constitution that would 
authorize or empower Congress to interfere with slavery. See A. Christopher Bryant, 
Stopping Time: The Pro-Slavery and "Irrevocable" Thirteenth Amendment, 26 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL'Y 501, 512-540 (2003). The Corwin amendment was not, however, passed by 
the requisite three-fourths of the states. It is unclear whether the Corwin Amendment 
would have been genuinely irrevocable, in the sense that it could never be repealed. !d. at 
534-40. But it certainly looked like it would have bindingly amended Article V, in the 
sense that post-Corwin procedures for amendment would have had to be used to get rid of 
it. For example, an act of Congress proposing an amendment repealing the Corwin 
Amendment would probably be considered interference with slavery and so forbidden. 
Douglas Linder, What in the Constitution Cannot Be Amended?, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 730 
(1981). The Corwin amendment could have been repealed only by calling a convention 
upon the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states, since that is the only 
method under Article V that would not involve congressional action. 
152. See SUBER, supra note 151, Appendix II. The amendment clauses of 35 state 
constitutions have been amended by their own procedures: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, 
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and West 
Virginia. 
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B. Self-limitation Within Authority 
Is there is a way of avoiding the conclusion that revolutions are 
ubiquitous, while still rejecting the possibility of an authorized 
lawmaker using his lawmaking power to change the content of his 
own authorization? Let us begin by considering a non-legal case 
concerning a subsidiary authority. Imagine that I authorize you to 
make rules for my child in my absence. While I am gone, you attempt 
to delegate your rulemaking power to someone else, in a way that 
cannot be rescinded, because you feel that this is in the best interest 
of my child. (Perhaps you feel a bout of temporary dementia coming 
on.) Do we have to conclude that your delegation was unsuccessful, 
because it remained rescindable, or that a revolution occurred, 
because you acted outside of my authorization? 
Is it not possible that your delegation was within my 
authorization? Perhaps I did not merely authorized you, but also 
anyone to whom you delegated your power, in a way that could not 
be rescinded by you. If I did, your delegation would be binding and 
non-revolutionary. But such delegation would not be an example of 
self-limitation of authority. To have self-limited your authority, you 
must have used the authority I gave you to change the authority that I 
gave you. For example, although I gave you the authority to only 
revocably delegate, you somehow used this authority to make it such 
that you could irrevocably delegate. When self-limitation of authority 
is understood in this fashion however, it is not surprising that it would 
have to be either unsuccessful or revolutionary. 
There are many ways that one can be authorized to self-limit 
one's rulemaking powers. For this reason, it is virtually impossible to 
specify in the language of an authorization all the forms of self-
limitation that are authorized or forbidden. Assume that I say: "I 
authorize you to make rules for my child in my absence." Taken 
literally, this language suggests that you are forbidden to delegate 
your rulemaking power in any way, even revocably. You alone, not 
anyone else, have the power to make rules for my child. To the 
extent that you can delegate, my authorization must have really been 
something like the following: "I authorize you to make rules for my 
child in my absence with the following exception: if you should 
delegate your powers to another rulemaker, the rules for my child will 
henceforth be whatever the delegated rulemaker says they are and 
not whatever you say they are." 
In short, we must look behind the language of an authorization to 
answer the question of whether self-limitation of rulemaking power is 
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authorized. Sometimes, of course, the question will not be 
answerable. But even in these unclear cases the fact that successful 
self-limitation takes place is not evidence that the authorized party 
used her authority to limit her authority. They are merely cases 
where we are unclear whether a revolution or authorized self-
limitation has occurred.153 
We can now apply this lesson to the self-limitation of power by 
subsidiary lawmakers. This should be distinguished from the 
lawmaker's power changing because of a change in the authorization 
he received from a higher-order lawmaker. For example, if Amar is 
right that the people are sovereign and that the lawmaker identified 
in Article V possesses authority only because the people say so, 
Article V can change (or be set aside entirely) as a result of a national 
vote. This is not a case of the lawmaker identified in Article V self-
limiting its power however. For that to occur, the procedures in 
Article V themselves must be used to amend Article V. 
The question of whether self-amendment of Article V is possible 
amounts to the question of whether the lawmaker responsible for 
Article V (which we are assuming is specified in Article VII) 
authorized the lawmaker identified in Article V to self-limit its 
power. This question cannot be answered by looking to the language 
of Article V itself. Taken literally, Article V forbids self-limitation, 
since it says only that the conventions or legislatures of three-quarters 
of the states can amend, not that some other body can amend if the 
conventions or legislatures of three-quarters of the states delegate 
their lawmaking power to that body. But powers of irrevocable 
delegation are tacit in many authorizations. It is for precisely this 
reason that amendment provisions in state constitutions are 
commonly amended, without the feeling that a revolution has 
153. My argument here relies in large part upon Alf Ross's solution to the puzzle of 
self-amendment. Ross, supra note 118, at 24. For arguments that there is no puzzle at all, 
see H.L.A. Hart, Self-Referring Laws, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 
170 (1983); Norbert Hoerster, On Alf Ross's Alleged Puzzle in Constitutional Law, 81 
MIND 422 (1962); Joseph Raz, Professor A. Ross and Some Legal Puzzles, 81 MIND 415 
(1962). For an argument that the puzzle can resist these criticisms, see SUBER, supra note 
151, §§ 5-10. Suber argues the puzzle is unsolvable, but he seriously misunderstands 
Ross's solution, describing the axiom that allows self-limitation of power as a 
"transcendent, immutable rule, universal across all systems." /d. § 6.B. The rule is not 
transcendent, in the sense of being beyond empirical confirmation, for, like any axiom, it 
can be extra-legally explained. It is an extra-legal question whether such an axiom exists 
or not. It is also not immutable, for it can be changed by revolution. Finally, it is not 
universal across legal systems, for some legal systems may allow self-limitation of power, 
while others may not. 
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occurred.154 There is no reason to think that Article V is any 
different. Nevertheless, the fact remains that if Article V can be 
amended, that will mean only that the body identified in Article V 
was authorized to self-limit its power, not that it changed its very 
authorization. 
Finally, we can consider the question of whether the supreme 
lawmaker within a legal system may self-limit its lawmaking power. 155 
Here too the question should be answered by reference to the scope 
of the relevant authorization, that is, the axiom of the legal system. 
And however one answers this question, the supreme lawmaker will 
be powerless to use his authority to change the axiom itself. If it is 
authorized to self-limit its power, it may do so, without revolution. 
But it may never legally change the scope of its authority. A change 
in the scope of its authority is possible only through revolution. 
Some binding self-limitation of power is generally within the 
authorization of all supreme lawmakers. For this reason the axiom of 
even the simplest legal system must be fairly complex. If "the law is 
whatever Louis XVI says it is" were the axiom of the French legal 
system in 1788, Louis would not merely have been unable to 
irrevocably delegate his lawmaking power-he would have had no 
ability to revocably delegate it. Indeed, he would have had no ability 
to name a successor, to abdicate, or to transfer his lawmaking 
authority upon his death. He, and, only he, would be the lawmaker of 
France. When he died, he would remain the sole lawmaker. There 
would be a sovereign but no laws. New laws would be able to come 
into being only through a revolutionary change of legal systems. 
Since Louis XVI must have had some authority to self-limit his 
lawmaking powers, it is not inconceivable that he could have had the 
ability to irrevocably recognize the Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and the power of the National Assembly in 1789. This bare 
possibility does not mean, of course, that the French Revolution 
never occurred. First of all, the axiom of the French legal system 
probably did not allow Louis to irrevocably delegate his lawmaking 
powers to someone other than a royal successor. But even if it did, 
154. SUBER, supra note 151, Appendix II. 
155. Ross in fact, confines himself to self-limitation of supreme authority. Ross, supra 
note 118, at 21-24. In other words, he rejects the possibility that the lawmaker identified 
in the axiom of the legal system can change its own authority. /d. But the examples he 
gives of these axioms are amendment provisions, such as Article 88 of the Danish 
Constitution and Article V of the United States Constitution. /d. passim. It is 
questionable that these are in fact the axioms, or part of the axioms, of the relevant legal 
systems. Article V, for example, was passed in accordance with Article VII. 
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the fact that the valid laws of the National Assembly could be 
justified by reference to the 1788 axiom does not mean that they were. 
The post-recognition axiom surely pointed solely to the National 
Assembly or the people of France. The justification of valid laws 
stopped at these bodies. It did not appeal further to Louis's act of 
irrevocable recognition.156 
Although a sovereign can be authorized to limit its lawmaking 
power, it cannot legally change its authority, because its authority 
depends upon an extra-legal source over which it has no legal control. 
And because self-limitation of authority is impossible, self-
authorization must be impossible as well. The very act of 
authorization presupposes that the extra-legal explanation is in place, 
which makes self-authorization both unnecessary and ineffective. 
Either Article VII gave the states authority to create the Constitution 
or it did not. If the extra-legal evidence shows that it did, then Article 
VII does not need to be authorized by the states. If the evidence 
shows that it did not, then Article VII cannot be authorized by the 
states because they have no lawmaking power. 
C. Amar on the Inalienability of Authority 
Amar appears to agree that the axiom of a legal system cannot 
be changed by the sovereign within that system. For example, he 
describes the legal right of the American people to choose their 
constitutions as "inalienable."157 This might be understood as the 
stronger claim that Americans could not do anything to lose this 
ultimate legal right. If they failed to exercise it (and so lapsed into a 
dictatorship of acquiescence), they would remain in a legal system in 
which they had ultimate lawmaking authority. There would be a 
lawmaker-the American people-but no laws. 
But it is hard to see how Amar could justify this stronger 
position. After all, he admits that extra-legal events were able to 
move us from a legal system in which the American people did not 
have ultimate lawmaking authority (the British one) to a legal system 
in which they did, so why could the same process not work in reverse? 
If Amar thought that laws always had to be ultimately justified legally 
by reference to the moral principle of popular sovereignty-that is, if 
he were a type of natural law theorist-then he could insist that 
nothing that Americans could do would lead them to lose their 
156. See LEFEBVRE, supra note 1, at 133-35 (arguing that by August of 1789 the 
validity of the Declaration of the Rights of Man did not depend upon royal approval). 
157. /d. at 464; Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 15, at 1050. 
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sovereignty, since Americans do not have the power to invalidate that 
moral principle. But, as we have seen, Amar believes that the moral 
principle of popular sovereignty became the legal axiom of the 
American system only because of certain social facts. 
I must conclude that Amar is merely speaking of legal 
alienation-an inalienability from within the American legal system. 
Indeed, my guess is that he is relying upon precisely the more 
comprehensive principle about the structure of legal systems that we 
uncovered above: the sovereign in any legal system may not enact a 
law that changes the axiom that gives it authority.158 This applies 
across the board. Just as the American people may not use their 
supreme lawmaking power to legalize absolute monarchy, Louis XVI 
may not use his supreme lawmaking power to legalize democracy. 
But events changed France from an absolute monarchy to a 
democracy, and they could change the United States from a 
democracy to a monarchy. Furthermore, these events can include the 
decisions of the American people themselves. Even if the American 
people cannot legally revoke their right to choose their constitutions, 
they could nevertheless make it such that they entered a legal system 
in which they no longer possessed this right. 
D. Amar's Exception to the Principle that Authority is Inalienable 
But the inalienability of authority makes it difficult for Amar to 
explain the ratification of the Constitution. He insists that before 
ratification the peoples of the states were unlimited sovereigns.159 But 
after it, unlimited sovereignty rested in the people of the United 
States as a whole.160 The simple explanation is that a revolution 
occurred-the ratification was no more legally effective in creating 
the American legal system out of the state legal systems than Louis 
XVI's recognition of the National Assembly could be in bringing 
about democracy.161 The act of ratification bound the states only 
from the perspective of the American legal system. From the 
perspective of the state systems, the Constitution was no different 
from the Articles of Confederation-it had legal effect only to the 
extent that it was recognized within these systems. 
158. See Amar, Consent, supra note 15, at 496 n.l54; Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 
15, at 1068. 
159. See Amar, Consent, supra note 15, at 507; Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 15, at 
1062-63; Amar, Sovereignty, supra note 36, at 1435. 
160. See Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 15, at 1062-63. 
161. Monaghan, supra note 135, at 135. 
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Because Amar is unwilling to accept a revolutionary explanation 
of the Founding, he carves out an exception to the inalienability of 
authority when one sovereign people are generated from a collection 
of multiple sovereign peoples: · 
It was by these very acts [of ratification] that previously 
separate state Peoples agreed to 'consolidate' themselves into a 
single continental People. Before ratification, the People of 
each state were indeed sovereign-and for that very reason 
could not be bound by the new Constitution if they chose not to 
ratify, no matter what any of the other sovereign Peoples chose 
to do. Thus, although Article VII required only nine states to 
ratify, it confirmed the pre-existing sovereignty of the People of 
each state by proclaiming that the Constitution would go into 
effect only between the nine or more states ratifying. The 
ratifications themselves thus formed the basic social compact by 
which formerly distinct sovereign Peoples, each acting in 
convention, agreed to reconstitute themselves into one common 
sovereignty.162 
In arguing that alienation of unlimited sovereignty is possible, Amar 
has succumbed to the fifth mistake concerning legal revolutions. 
For Amar the Article VII process legally bridged legal systems. 
Although the result of the ratification process was a unified American 
sovereign, "the pre-existing sovereignty of the People of each state" 
was integral to the process, because no state's people were required 
to relinquish their authority without their consent. But the fact that 
the state's people could not lose their authority without their consent 
hardly confirms their sovereignty. If the state peoples truly were 
unlimited sovereigns, as Amar insists, their act of consent could not 
bind them at all. As the ultimate determiners of law, they could make 
their consent a legal nullity at will. The very idea that they could bind 
themselves by their consent must mean that even before they 
consented they were participating in a legal system whose valid laws 
could not be traced back to their individual will. Although this legal 
system gave them a choice about whether they would be obligated 
under the Constitution, it did not give them a choice about legal 
consequences of their choice. 
In short, Article VII could make unilateral secession impossible 
after ratification only on the assumption that the state peoples had 
already lost their unlimited sovereignty before ratification. Only then 
162. Amar, Sovereignty, supra note 36, at 1460 (emphasis in original). 
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could the legal consequences of their ratification be beyond their 
control. That means that the ratification, far from bridging state and 
federal legal systems, had legal effect only from the perspective of the 
new federal legal system. For the ratification to occur a revolution 
must have already taken place. 
Even if Amar understands the state peoples' sovereignty as 
unlimited, however, we do not have to ourselves. Their sovereignty 
could have been limited in the sense that the irrevocable delegation 
of their lawmaking power was allowed under the axioms of their legal 
systems. If the officials of the Massachusetts legal system did not look 
to the people of Massachusetts as the ultimate standard of legal 
validity, but looked to this people until they delegated their power to 
another lawmaker (such as the people of the United States), it seems 
that the ratification could create an American legal system without 
revolution. Amar succumbs to the fifth mistake because of his 
commitment to the unlimited nature of sovereignty. This forced him 
to conclude that the state peoples were somehow able to legally alter 
the very axiom that gave them authority. 
Nevertheless, even if Amar had conceded that the state peoples' 
authority was already limited under the axioms of the state legal 
systems, in the sense that they could irrevocably delegate their 
lawmaking power to another more comprehensive people, there is 
still a problem with a non-revolutionary explanation of the 
ratification. Simply because legal systems share the same sovereign 
does not mean that they are the same legal system. They will be 
unified only if, as an extra-legal matter, the practices that are the 
sources of the systems unite. For example, imagine that soon after 
1776, Massachusetts and New Hampshire-feeling expansionist, but 
also democratic-each claimed to be the United States. In other 
words, the officials in each system looked to the people of the United 
States as the sovereign of their system. This situation would not be 
sustainable for long, since the absence of any Massachusetts or New 
Hampshire officials and institutions in the other states would mean 
that there would be no procedures for the sovereign to speak within 
the Massachusetts or New Hampshire systems. Nevertheless, while it 
lasted, there would be two independent legal systems, each of which 
was, as an internal legal matter, the United States, in the sense that the 
people of the United States was the sovereign for each system. 
Things might not have been much different after the ratification 
of the Constitution. Even though from the perspective of the thirteen 
state systems the people of the United States would be sovereign-
that would be true only from within each of the state systems. It 
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would not yet follow that there was a United States, understood as a 
unified legal system. There could still have been thirteen (unstable) 
legal systems each sharing the same sovereign. 
It is true that legal practices are very likely to merge if they claim 
the same sovereign. If the participants in thirteen legal practices each 
believe they have unified, then they are likely to make that belief 
concrete. But the extra-legal fact of unification is the reason for the 
unity of the legal systems. Because Amar fails to appreciate this 
extra-legal dimension of the ratification, he treats the creation of the 
American legal system out of the state systems as if it were a purely 
legal matter of the ratification. An extra-legal event, which was not 
assured by the ratification, was necessary-the revolutionary 
unification of legal systems that gave birth to the United States. 
VI. SIXTH MISTAKE: MISIDENTIFYING THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL 
LAWMAKING 
A. Judicial Lawmaking 
Up to this point, we have not much considered the role of courts 
as lawmaking bodies. It is clear that the axiom of a legal system, or 
an authority within that system, may give courts the power to create 
common law.163 But what about lawmaking through judicial 
interpretation of law? Courts would have such lawmaking power if 
their interpretations of law were taken by officials within the system 
as authoritative, in the sense that officials looked to the opinions and 
not the law itself when determining what norms should be enforced. 
There are two ways that this can occur. On the one hand, the 
judgment that the judge issues can be valid-in the sense that other 
legal actors must respect the judgment even if the law was 
misinterpreted. On the other hand, the interpretation of the law in 
the court's written opinion can be valid, in the sense that other legal 
actors are bound to respect that interpretation-not their own views 
about the uninterpreted law-in future situations. 
Few have seriously doubted that interpretations are-and should 
be-binding in the first sense.164 A concrete judgment (for example 
providing damages to a plaintiff or acquitting a criminal defendant) 
must be respected and enforced by other legal actors, even if they 
163. Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REV. 
263, 279 (1992). 
164. The sole example I am aware of is Michael Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: 
Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 276--84 (1994). 
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believe (correctly) that it is based upon a misinterpretation of the 
law.165 On the other hand, whether judicial interpretations of the law 
should be binding beyond the particular case adjudicated has been a 
matter of more debate. Some have questioned whether federal 
courts' interpretation of federal law-and particularly the United 
States Constitution-should be binding upon the other branches of 
the federal government, or even upon the states.166 
Nevertheless, it certainly seems safe to say that some 
interpretations are in fact treated as binding in our legal system, 
whether or not they should be. For example, consider the 
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment provided by the Supreme 
Court in Hans v. Louisiana. 167 The Eleventh Amendment states that 
"[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to 
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against 
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens 
or Subjects of any Foreign State."168 This language appears drafted to 
end a source of diversity jurisdiction otherwise available in Article 
III, namely jurisdiction for "controversies . . . between a State and 
Citizens of another State."169 So understood, the Eleventh 
Amendment would not preclude a federal question action brought 
against a state in federal court, particularly one brought by a citizen 
of that same state.170 This is the prevailing view of the Eleventh 
165. See Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword: We the Court, 
115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2001); Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. 
REV. 979, 988-89 (1987); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as 
Explanations for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 46 (1993); MichaelS. Paulsen, The 
Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 
CARDOZO L. REV. 81, 82 (1993). 
166. See, e.g., Meese, supra note 165; Paulsen, supra note 165. The Supreme Court 
declared that its constitutional rulings are binding in this stronger sense in Cooper v. 
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
167. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1890). 
168. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
169. U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2, cl. 1. 
170. The history of the Amendment supports this reading. The Eleventh Amendment 
was enacted to abrogate the Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 
Dall.) 419 (1793). See CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 71 (1972). Chisholm was a state law action in the United States 
Supreme Court brought by the South Carolina executor of the estate of a South Carolina 
merchant, Robert Farquhar, to collect revolutionary war debt owed by the State of 
Georgia. Chisholm argued, and the Supreme Court agreed, that the Court had federal 
subject matter jurisdiction under diversity. /d. at 425. The language of the Eleventh 
Amendment was crafted to end this source of jurisdiction. Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme 
Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 45-46 
(1988); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, What is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 
1683, 1696 (1997). 
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Amendment among legal scholars.171 And yet the Hans Court read 
the Eleventh Amendment as recognizing a more comprehensive 
principle of state sovereign immunity in federal courts that applies to 
federal question actions, including those between a state and a citizen 
of that same state. 
It would be a mischaracterization of our legal system, however, 
to say that our Eleventh Amendment-the Amendment as it exists in 
our current legal system-solely concerns diversity jurisdiction. The 
interpretation in Hans "has been folded into the Eleventh 
Amendment itself. "172 Deference to the Supreme Court's reading is 
so complete that only legal scholars have views about the original 
uninterpreted Eleventh Amendment. What practitioners know is the 
Amendment as interpreted by Hans. 
Assume that all judicial interpretations of the law are binding in 
this sense. This would mean that, rather than understanding the 
Commerce Clause as authorizing Congress to make law, we would 
have to understand it as authorizing the courts to authorize Congress 
to make law through their interpretations of the Commerce Clause. 
And Sarbanes-Oxley, in turn, would authorize the courts to authorize 
the SEC to make law. Indeed, section 205.3(b)(l) would be 
understood, not as a command to attorneys practicing before the 
SEC, but as an authorization to the courts to create commands 
applying to such attorneys. 173 
171. See, e.g., JACOBS, supra note 170, at 83-97 (noting that Article III extends federal 
jurisdiction to all federal question controversies without regard for the character of the 
parties); Amar, Sovereignty, supra note 36, at 1476 (opining that Hans was "clear error"); 
David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Government Wrongs, 44 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1, 32 (1972) ("[T]he Court in Hans veered far from the course .... "); 
Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: 
Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 515-16 (1978) (noting that recent scholarship suggests 
that the Eleventh Amendment was not meant to completely preclude suits in federal court 
against the states by private individuals); William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation 
of the Eleventh Amendment: A Reply to Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261, 1262-64 (1989) 
(defending the diversity theory, which interprets the Eleventh Amendment as not closing 
off other sources of federal jurisdiction); Lawrence Marshall, Fighting the Words of the 
Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1342 passim (1989) (noting that the text of the 
Eleventh Amendment clearly does not preclude all suits against a state); David L. Shapiro, 
Comment, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and 
the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61, 70 (1984) (suggesting that Hans was "an 
unforced error."). 
172. Shapiro, supra note 171, at 71. 
173. The legal role that "erroneous" judicial decisions or other governmental acts 
(including the passage of statutes) can play within a legal system is meticulously explored 
in the Fehlerkalkiil (calculus of error) of Adolf Merkl. ADOLF MERKL, DIE LEHRE VON 
DER RECHTSKRAFT ENTWICKELT AUS OEM RECHTSBEGRIFF 293 (1923). Kelsen 
followed Merkl in this regard. See INTRODUCTION, supra note 16, at 70-89; PURE 
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Conversely courts would be forbidden to make law by 
interpreting law if anything but a single interpretation of a law was 
ignored by officials within the system as void. This is probably true, 
for example, of Article VII. Article VII does not authorize the courts 
to authorize (retroactively) the conventions of the original thirteen 
states to enact the Constitution. The reason is that, if a court were to 
declare the Constitution invalid because of its interpretation of 
Article VII, its decision would simply be ignored by the community of 
officials even if the court's decision were not invalidated through legal 
channels. The court would not be accepted as having lawmaking 
power in that area. 
This official resistance to deviant judicial interpretations does not 
have to mean that the legal justification of the Constitution is official 
acceptance, rather than Article VII, or that the Constitution has no 
legal justification as law at all-that is, that it is simply part of the 
axiom of our legal system.174 For it may still be true that officials, 
when asked why the Constitution is valid, would appeal to Article 
V.II-not claim that its status as law is in need of no justification or 
that official acceptance is the justification. All their resistance might 
mean is that they do not defer to courts' interpretation of Article VII. 
Article VII would authorize the conventions of the original thirteen 
states directly, rather than authorizing the courts to authorize these 
conventions. See Figure P. 
THEORY, supra note 16, at 236-56, 267-78. For a discussion of Kelsen's views, see 
generally EBENSTEIN, supra note 28, at 127-32; RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, 
PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 250-91 (2003); Stanley L. Paulson, Kelsen on Legal 
Interpretation, 10 LEGAL STUD.: J. SOC'Y PUB. TCHRS. L. 136 (1990); Stanley L. Paulson, 
Material and Formal Authorization in Kelsen's Pure Theory, 39 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 172 
(1980); Stanley L. Paulson, Subsumption, Derogation, and Noncontradiction in "Legal 
Science," 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 802 (1981). 
174. See supra Section II. B. 
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Figure P 
T 
5 
Of course, judicial lawmaking of some sort is inevitable in any 
system with courts. Courts exist because there is disagreement about 
the application of the law. If there were no disagreement-if what 
counted as a correct application was as clear as what counts as a 
correct move in chess-adjudicators would be no more necessary in a 
legal system than they are in games of chess. And without some 
deference to courts' decisions, they could not function to resolve 
disagreement about the application of the law. 
But it does not follow that judicial lawmaking occurs whenever 
courts use their own judgment to apply the law. After all, whenever a 
court decides a case, it must rely upon its own judgment about 
whether the Constitution is valid law. But it has no lawmaking power 
in applying, say, Article VII, for it cannot diverge from the common 
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understanding of Article VII without its decision being treated as a 
legal nullity. 
With this in mind, consider a recent argument by Matthew Adler 
and Michael Dorf that judicial review concerning whether a law has 
satisfied constitutional "existence conditions"-that is, conditions for 
something to be a law, rather than a nullity-is inevitable in any legal 
system in which courts can issue binding judgments applying the 
law.175 Adler and Dorf's argument appeals to the fact that a court 
must exercise its own judgment about whether these existence 
conditions are satisfied: 
Imagine, for example, a law enacted in conformity with Section 
7 of Article I that purports to require a three-fifths majority in 
each house for all subsequent measures raising taxes and that 
further declares itself amendable only by a three-fifths majority 
in each house. Even in the counter-Marbury world, it seems 
clear that a federal court would have to engage in 
nondeferential constitutional reasoning in order to determine 
whether to treat this law as binding in the face of a subsequent 
measure-enacted by simple majorities of both houses of 
Congress, signed by the President, and thus appearing to be an 
authoritative utterance of Congress-purporting to repeal it. 176 
According to Adler and Dorf, "judges cannot avoid enforcing those 
provisions of the Constitution that identify the procedure for 
legislation and perhaps those that demarcate Congress's powers. "177 
But it is also true that Congress cannot defer to a judicial opinion 
without determining-without deference-whether it actually satisfies 
the existence conditions for a judicial opinion. If Congress were 
obligated to defer to anything that claimed to be a judicial opinion 
concerning the issue of whether it actually is a judicial opinion, our 
legal system would collapse. Any lunatic could announce something 
as a judicial opinion and Congress would be obligated to accept it as 
such. So it seems that there must be congressional review of judicial 
opinions just as much as there must be judicial review of statutes. 
Why do people not talk about such congressional review? The 
reason is that officials tend to agree to such a high degree about 
whether the existence conditions for a judicial opinion have been 
175. Matthew D . Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Existence Conditions and 
Judicial Review, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1111-16, 1122-28 (2003). 
176. /d. at 1111-12. 
177. /d. at 1114. 
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satisfied that any deviation by Congress, any attempt to treat a 
Supreme Court opinion as not "really" an opinion, would be 
immediately perceived as legally void. The fact that Congress must 
exercise its own judgment to determine whether something is a 
judicial opinion gives it no legal power. 
Congress's situation is similar to that of a player in a game of 
chess. Each player must exercise her own non-deferential judgment 
about whether her opponent has made a correct move in a game. If 
she had a duty to accept whatever her opponent claimed was a correct 
move, the game would collapse-for her opponent could move his 
pieces any way he wanted. But this does not mean that she has 
power, within the game, of reviewing her opponent's moves. For the 
minute her judgment deviated from the common understanding of 
what a correct move is like, her opponent would balk and the game 
would come to a halt. 
Adler and Dorf ignore the possibility that the same phenomenon 
could exist in connection with judicial review of whether a law 
satisfies constitutional existence conditions. Although federal courts 
would have to exercise their independent judgment about whether 
existence conditions are satisfied, this might not generate meaningful 
judicial review, because the court would be unable to issue a binding 
judgment that deviated from officialdom's common understanding 
concerning the existence conditions' scope. 
B. Is the Law What a Court Says It Is? 
Nevertheless the fact remains that judicial lawmaking of some 
sort must exist in a system with courts. Courts cannot fulfill their role 
of resolving disagreement concerning the law unless their judgments 
legally bind those who disagree to some extent. And in our legal 
system the scope of judicial lawmaking appears so expansive that it is 
reasonable to inquire as whether the law that the courts interpret puts 
any legal restrictions upon a judge. Since judicial misinterpretations 
of the Commerce Clause or Sarbanes-Oxley or section 205.3(b)(l) are 
treated as valid, in what sense do the laws play any role within our 
legal system at all? Why not simply say that under the axiom of our 
legal system the law is whatever the courts say it is?178 See Figure Q. 
178. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 121 (2d ed. 
1921) ("Thus far we have seen that the Law is made up of the rules for decision which the 
courts lay down; that all such rules are Law; that rules for conduct which the courts do not 
apply are not Law; that the fact that the courts apply rules is what makes them Law; that 
there is no mysterious entity 'The Law' apart from these rules; and that the judges are 
rather the creators than the discovers of the Law."). This position reaches back at least as 
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Figure Q 
Despite courts' expansive authority to make law by interpreting 
law, we do not inhabit a legal system in which courts are sovereign. In 
arguing for this conclusion, let me begin with H.L.A. Hart's analogy 
of a game (assume it is baseball) in which umpires' misapplications of 
the rules are nevertheless binding on the players: 
(T]he scorer's determinations ... are unchallengeable. In this 
sense it is true that for the purposes of the game "the score is 
what the scorer says it is." But it is important to see that the 
scoring rule remains ... and it is the scorer's duty to apply it as 
best he can. "The score is what the scorer says it is" would be 
false if it meant that there was no rule for scoring save what the 
far as Bishop Hoadley, who argued in 1717 that "[w]hoever hath an absolute Authority to 
interpret any written or spoken Laws; it is He, who is truly the Law-giver, to all Intents and 
Purposes; and not the Person who first wrote, or spoke them." Bishop Benjamin Hoadly, 
Sermon Preached Before King George I, at 12 (Mar. 31, 1717) (emphasis in original). 
Hoadly's argument is commonly attributed to the legal realists. See, e.g., DAVID 
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 20-21 (1988) (summarizing legal 
realism); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional 
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1387 (1997) (identifying Chief Justice Hughes' 
statement that "the Constitution is what the [Supreme Court] say[s] it is" as an element of 
legal realism); Sanford Levinson, Why I Do Not Teach Marbury (Except To Eastern 
Europeans) and Why You Shouldn't Either, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553, 569-70 (2003) 
("Finally, I believe that emphasizing Marbury reinforces the single most pernicious aspect 
of American legal education, which is to instill in hapless students the most vulgar of all 
notions of Legal Realism, summarized in Charles Evans Hughes' identification of 'the 
Constitution' with what the 'judges say it is.' "(citations omitted)); Kenneth Ward, The 
Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty and Legal Realist Perspectives of Law, 18 J.L. & POL. 851, 
855, 870 (2002) (associating legal realism with the view that "law is what judges say it is."). 
For two classic statements of the realist position, see KARL LLEWELLYN, 
BRAMBLE BUSH 3 (1930) ("What officials do about disputes is, to my mind, the law 
itself."); Holmes, supra note 58, at 461 ("The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, 
and nothing pretentious, are what I mean by the law."). 
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[official] scorer in his discretion chose to apply. There might 
indeed be a game with such a rule, and some amusement might 
be found in playing it if the scorer's discretion were exercised 
with some regularity; but it would be a different game. We may 
call such a game the game of "scorer's discretion."179 
The difference between baseball and scorer's discretion is that 
baseball players make independent judgments about how the game is 
proceeding. They often conclude that the umpire is mistaken and 
criticize him for violating the rules of the game (even though they 
accept his decisions as binding). If they were playing the game of 
scorer's discretion, such criticism would make no sense. The very 
point of scorer's discretion is to do whatever the scorer says-there is 
no ground, from within the rules of the game, for criticizing what the 
scorer says. 
Hart's argument, as it stands, is not persuasive however. 
Granted, in baseball umpires are criticized for making "wrong" 
decisions. But this is not enough to conclude that the umpire has a 
duty under the rules of baseball to decide correctly. After all, an 
umpire would probably be criticized for imitating a monkey after 
every pitch, but we would not want to conclude that he therefore has 
a duty under the rules of baseball not to imitate monkeys. He would 
only be violating a duty within what we can call the "culture" of 
baseball. It is not a duty generated by the rules of the game. The 
reason is that imitating a monkey has no effect within the game. It 
does not, for example, invalidate the umpire's rulings or make 
sanctions against the umpire appropriate. 
Hart has not explained why baseball is not a game of scorer's 
discretion, with duties outside the rules of the game that require the 
umpire to rule correctly. The only reason to conclude that an 
umpire's error is a violation of the rules of the game is that 
identifiable instructions for the game speak of what would be a 
correct ruling and there are no identifiable instructions that tell 
umpires not to imitate monkeys. For example, we are told that a 
"strike" includes a pitch "which ... is not struck at, if any part of the 
ball passes through any part of the strike zone. "180 That is a reason to 
think that an umpire who calls a pitch a strike even when it is outside 
of the strike zone has violated the rules, not merely the culture of the 
179. HART, supra note 59, at 142. 
180. Official Rules of Major League Baseball 2.00 (2004), at http://www.mlb.com/ 
NASApp/mlb/mlb/official_info/official_rules/definition_terms_2.jsp (last visited Dec. 13, 
2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). 
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game. 
But that simply returns us to our problem. For there is another 
rule-giving the umpire's rulings finality181-according to which the 
earlier rules have no effect within the game. Even if a pitch that is not 
struck at is outside the strike zone, it is nevertheless treated as a strike 
in the game if the umpire rules it is a strike. The rules defining a 
strike have no more effect within the game than the prohibition of 
monkey imitations. That seems to push the rules defining a strike out 
of the game and into the mere culture of baseball. 
I believe Hart's example of scorer's discretion is better 
understood as a challenge to the idea that the umpire's rulings are in 
fact always authoritative. Assume that an umpire rules a batter out 
even though no pitch has yet been thrown. Unlike a less egregious 
error, this ruling would very likely be treated as invalid within the 
game, in very much the same way that a deranged fan who ran on the 
field and started making rulings would find his rulings treated as 
invalid. Furthermore, when the players came to the conclusion the 
umpire's ruling was invalid, they would be relying upon the 
instructions defining a strike. 
In short, we can find a role for the instructions defining a strike 
within the game of baseball, although it is not the role that they 
appear to have. These instructions set up a broad (albeit vague) 
standard of reasonableness beyond which the umpire's rulings will be 
void. For this reason, a pitch is not always a strike if the umpire says 
it is a strike. On the other hand, a reasonable but erroneous ruling is 
valid in the game (although it may be a violation of the culture of 
baseball). 
This is an important difference between baseball and the game of 
scorer's discretion. In scorer's discretion, any ruling by the umpire is 
valid. Players who objected to the umpire's ruling could not be 
objecting on the ground that the umpire violated the rules of the 
game. They could only be appealing to duties that the umpire had 
outside the game. 
The same points can be made with respect to legal systems. One 
can imagine circumstances where a judgment that radically misapplies 
the law would be treated as a nullity within the legal system. For 
example, if a judge ruled that the author of a materially misleading 
181. Id. at 9.02(a) ("Any umpire's decision which involves judgment, such as, but not 
limited to, whether a batted ball is fair or foul, whether a pitch is a strike or a ball, or 
whether a runner is safe or out, is final. No player, manager, coach or substitute shall 
object to any such judgment decisions.") (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). 
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SEC filing should be summarily executed or should be liable to the 
judge herself for the sum of $10,000,000, she would find her decision 
treated as void, in much the same way that a delusional citizen who 
jumped into the judge's seat would find his decisions treated as void. 
It would not have to be nullified-for example, on appeal or through 
legislative action. It would instead be a nullity ab initio. 
Furthermore, in not following it, officials would not think that they 
were revolutionaries. To the contrary, they would think of 
themselves as maintaining the continuity of the legal order. What 
would have been revolutionary is if they had followed the court's 
decision. 
C. Bush v. Gore 
We have concluded that courts have genuine, but limited, 
authority to make law through their interpretations (and 
misinterpretations) of law. The belief that courts have no authority to 
make law in this fashion or that their authority does not go beyond 
choosing from a small set of highly plausible interpretations is our 
sixth mistake concerning legal revolutions. Because this confusion 
treats the courts' powers to make law as more restrictive than they 
really are, it makes perfectly legal events look like revolutions. 
Assume that a court acted outside its authority every time its 
interpretation deviated from what is most plausible. If a deviant 
decision were nevertheless accepted as valid, there would have been a 
shift in the chains of legal validity. Valid law could no longer be 
traced back to the sovereign in the system. Although the court was a 
mere subsidiary lawmaker within the system, it would now be 
supreme. 
This is the way Bush v. Gore182 has been characterized by some of 
its critics. As Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson put it, the decision 
was a "judicial coup"183-"[ a] colossal act of illegality that subverts 
182. 531 u.s. 98 (2000). 
183. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 12, at 1108; see also ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 
200 (contesting "the five's revolutionary doctrines"); Farnsworth, supra note 12, at 235 
(describing the Supreme Court's decision as "lawless"); Sanford Levinson, Bush v. Gore 
and the French Revolution: A Tentative List of Some Early Lessons, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 7, 28 (Summer 2002) ("One powerful consequence of Bush v. Gore, then, is that it 
further entrenches the monarch-like status of the United States Supreme Court as 
'ultimate constitutional interpreter,' with a monarch-like royal prerogative to ignore 
ordinary legal restraints when necessary to protect the public good."). For a skeptical 
account of such claims with respect to other Supreme Court decisions, see Fried, supra 
note 139, at 33 (arguing that even in radical decisions, "the Court's exercise of power 
claimed to be interpretive, not revolutionary, and was accepted as such"). 
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constitutional structures."184 The Supreme Court acted outside its 
authority in Bush v. Gore. Due to acquiescence in the decision by 
officials and the American people, however, it is now being treated as 
legal. This means that there has been a shift in legal systems (albeit a 
subtle one). The members of the Supreme Court "appear to have 
gotten away with it,"185 just as President Mirza got away with shifting 
supreme authority in Pakistan from the constitution (or its ratifiers) 
to himself. And like President Mirza's, the Supreme Court's coup 
was the "cumulative result of successful partisan entrenchment" 
within the institutions of the old system.186 
So understood, Balkin and Levinson's criticisms distort the 
structure of the legal system they claim to defend. Bush v. Gore is not 
a legal nullity that gained its validity only through extra-legal changes 
in legal practice. For that would mean that had this extra-legal shift 
not occurred-had we remained in the same legal system-the 
decision would have been ignored by other legal actors as unworthy 
of a legal response. But we all know that the true revolution would 
have been if the Court's decision had been ignored, if everyone else 
had simply acted as if it had not really decided the case at all. 
Balkin and Levinson characterize public and official 
acquiescence in the decision as the type of passivity that allows coups 
to succeed: 
[T]he message from many quarters these days is that we should 
forget about it: The Supreme Court has spoken, Bush won the 
election, he is in the White House, and one should get over it. 
Let's move on. We do not doubt the emotional conflict that 
many Americans now face. It is hard to admit that one lives in 
a country that has just suffered through a judicial coup. And 
many people will do almost anything to avoid recognizing that 
very unsettling fact. 187 
In fact, this acquiescence is precisely why the decision was legally 
valid. This was not a new form of acquiescence that shifted 
sovereignty. It was precisely the same (limited) acquiescence to 
judicial decisions that has always existed and that keeps us within the 
American legal system.188 
184. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 12, at 1050. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 1068. 
187. ld. at 1107-08 (citations omitted). 
188. My argument is, of course, the furthest thing from a justification of the Supreme 
Court's opinion, in the sense in which opinions are justified in law reviews. It is instead an 
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Although much of what Balkin and Levinson say-especially 
their use of the phrase "judicial coup"-suggests the interpretation I 
have offered above, Professor Balkin has privately argued that their 
position is "that the Court acted in violation of the law, but [not] that 
we have shifted [legal] regimes as a result."189 The Court's decision is 
simply an illegality within an abiding legal system: 
We shouldn't confuse illegality in a particular case with 
revolution and the creation of a new legal regime. It is 
perfectly possible for a government official to break the law, 
even egregiously, have nobody complain about it or acquiesce 
in what they have done, and not create a revolution or a shift in 
legal regime. It happens all the time. Think about police 
brutality. Or torture. These actions don't change the legal 
regime. They are illegal within the existing legal regime. In 
particular courts can act illegally, and people can acquiesce in 
their decisions, and life goes on. But it isn't a revolution. It's 
like getting beaten up by a crooked cop.190 
The analogy with police brutality is inapt however. Police brutality 
may remain unremedied, but it is not actually considered by the 
population (and particularly by the officials who participate in the 
rule of recognition) to be legal. In contrast, Bush v. Gore is treated as 
the law. Indeed, if officials were to view police brutality as legally 
permissible, it would be fair to say that a revolution had occurred. 
What Balkin and Levinson need is an account of official 
acceptance of the decision as law that does not amount to a 
revolutionary change in the standards of legal legitimacy. Balkin has 
suggested this possibility: 
[I]t is very important to distinguish acceptance of an act as legal 
from acceptance of the legality of the consequences that flow 
from that act. . . . People often believe that consequences will 
be legal even if the original act was illegal. . . . Why? Because 
people like stability and the benefits of procedural regularity 
going forward into the future. In order to achieve these goods, 
. . . some degree of illegality will be accepted in the system 
(sometimes grudgingly) if there is nothing one can do about it, 
observation about the remarkably broad scope of the Supreme Court's lawmaking powers 
within our legal system. For a justification of the opinion, see, for example, Nelson Lund, 
The Unbearable Rightness of Bush v. Gore, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1219 (2002). 
189. E-mail from Jack Balkin (June 16, 2004, 04:14 EST) (on file with the North 
Carolina Law Review). 
190. /d. 
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and the consequences that flow from that original illegality will 
be accepted too .... 191 
But what is the difference between the acquiescence in illegality 
in the interest of stability that fails to change the legal system and the 
very same acquiescence that leads to a revolution? After all, it was 
undoubtedly true that officials in Pakistan acquiesced in President 
Mirza's coup because they liked "stability and the benefits of 
procedural regularity going forward into the future. "192 So why not 
say that there was no coup in Pakistan in 1958-and that Mirza's acts 
were simply illegalities whose consequences were accepted within the 
old legal system in which the Constituent Assembly was sovereign? 
Balkin might argue that the difference is that Bush v. Gore was 
not as radical an illegality as Mirza's coup. Officials in our legal 
system have acquiesced in illegalities similar to Bush v. Gore in the 
past. But if this is true, then why not simply say that the Supreme 
Court is authorized under the rule of recognition to make law through 
its interpretations-and misinterpretations-of law? Why call Bush 
v. Gore "illegal" when its consequences and the consequences of 
similar decisions by the Supreme Court are habitually treated by 
officials as legal? What does this alleged illegality mean, when it 
makes no difference within.our legal system? 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have argued that attending to the structure of 
legal systems can reveal mistakes that arise when legal revolutions are 
discussed. Since these mistakes reveal themselves as mistakes only in 
the light of this structure, however, what reason do we have to believe 
that the law actually abides by this structure in the first place? 
It would be one thing if I could point to the structure 
constraining, in some way, the extra-legal facts. But I admitted that 
the structure of legal systems is ultimately extra-legally explained. 
We only know what the axiom of a legal system is through extra-legal 
evidence. But if that is true, what could possibly be added by talking 
about the structure over and above the extra-legal through which it is 
explained? Why not simply talk about the law as seen from that 
extra-legal perspective, for example in terms of certain patterns of 
acceptance by officials? 
191. E-mail from Jack Balkin (June 18, 2004 12:37 EST) (on file with the North 
Carolina Law Review). 
192. /d. 
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This is indeed a serious challenge to the approach of this 
Article-one that I believe was raised by the American legal 
realists.193 The realist, as I understand him, bites the bullet and denies 
that there is any significance to talk of "valid" law. The only 
appropriate perspective on the law is extra-legal, and "law" exists 
only to the extent that it can be described in extra-legal terms-that 
is, in terms of conventions, attitudes and relationships of power and 
influence. 
Something important is lost when the realist's approach is 
adopted, however. Consider the following analogy from the 
philosophy of logic. Even logicists admit that people accept the 
foundational axioms of logic-such as the law of non-contradiction-
for extra-logical reasons.194 The causes of our agreement about these 
axioms are physiological, psychological and sociological-for 
example, the constitution of our brains, certain innate habits or 
instincts, and socialization by parents and teachers.195 If logical 
reasoning can be explained extra-logically, why not give up on logical 
structure entirely and simply speak in physiological, psychological 
and sociological terms? 
The problem is that once we adopt the extra-logical perspective, 
logical continuity and discontinuity vanish. Assume that, starting 
with the premise "all whales are mammals," someone concludes "all 
whales are mammals and are not mammals." From the extra-logical 
perspective, this inference is contrary to the way that physiology, 
psychology and sociology tell us people normally behave. But it is 
not discontinuous. The extra-logical perspective cannot make sense 
of the revolutionary nature of the inference-the impossibility of 
getting to the conclusion from the premises within the structure of our 
logical system. 
By analogy, the legal realist may be right, but if she is, legal 
revolutions are impossible. To the extent that the law is simply 
constituted by certain patterns of behavior, the movement from one 
set of patterns to another, whether it is gradual or sudden, has none 
of the discontinuity and incommensurability that we associate with 
revolutions. Granted, the realist has no reason to deny the 
occurrence of the sociological changes associated with revolutions. 
But seen from his purely extra-legal perspective, these changes are 
not discontinuous. 
193. See supra Section II.A. 
194. See supra Section II.A. 
195. See supra Section II.A. 
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Consider the differing responses of a realist and someone 
committed to my approach as the events in late eighteenth century 
North America unfolded. For the latter, one set of valid laws-a set 
justified by the authority of the British King-in-Parliament-is 
replaced by an incommensurable set of valid laws justified by a 
different authority. She cannot legally reason from the first set to the 
second, because the revolution involves a shift in the axioms on the 
basis of which such reasoning is undertaken. For the realist, in 
contrast, there is no such shift in axioms, because he has abandoned 
the activity of reasoning about "the law" in favor of extra-legally 
determining how relationships of power and influence can be 
navigated. When these relationships change, the realist, of course, 
changes his behavior to accommodate them, but the principles by 
means of which he extra-legally reasons remains the same. 
My argument, therefore, is not that the structure of legal systems 
must apply, but that it applies to the extent that one believes in the 
possibility of revolutions. One can look at the law as the realist does, 
but the price one pays is that legal discontinuity and continuity 
vanish. The fact that we believe revolutions are possible shows our 
commitment to the structure. 
The same answer applies to a more limited criticism. One can 
admit that legal systems have a structure but argue that the structure 
is often indeterminate, in the sense that it will be unclear whether an 
act is inside or outside the authority of a lawmaker. But, once again, I 
am not arguing that the structure must be fully determinate-only 
that it is precisely as determinate as our belief in the possibility of 
revolution. 
Consider the case of Harris v. Minister of the Interior. 196 The 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa struck 
down a statute passed by the South African Parliament that 
disenfranchised certain "non-European"-that is, mixed-race-
voters.197 The Appellate Division's reason was that, under a clause in 
the South Africa Act, a statute with subject matter of this sort had to 
be passed by a two-thirds vote of both houses sitting in joint 
session.198 The statute had not satisfied these requirements, since it 
was passed by simple majorities of the separate houses of 
196. 1952 (2) S.A. 428 (A). The case is discussed in HART, supra note 59, at 122. See 
also Erwin N. Griswold, The "Coloured Vote Case" in South Africa, 65 HARV. L. REV. 
1361 (1952) (discussing Harris, soon after the decision was announced). 
197. See Harris, 1952 (2) S.A. at 449-50,472. 
198. /d. 
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Parliament.199 The Parliament's response was to enact, by simple 
majorities of the separate houses, the High Court of Parliament Act, 
which created an appellate body for review of decisions by the 
Appellate Division that struck down Parliamentary statutes.Z00 The 
new High Court dutifully overturned the Appellate Division's 
decision.201 The Appellate Division, in turn, struck down the High 
Court of Parliament Act.202 
Eventually the Parliament changed tactics, deciding instead to 
pack the Appellate Division.203 Once packed, the Court reversed 
itself.204 But what if the Parliament had not changed tactics? Whose 
word would be law-the Parliament (through its High Court) or the 
Appellate Division? 
The structure of legal systems does not demand an answer to this 
question. All it demands is that, if there is no answer, no 
revolutionary break in legal continuity will occur no matter whose 
word gets treated as law. Furthermore, this lacuna does not mean 
that structural concerns have no role in understanding the legal 
system in other respects. We can still say that a revolution would 
have occurred, for example, had a court of the General Division, 
which are trial courts in the South Africa legal system, defied the 
Appellate Division and this defiance came to be accepted as legal. 
Our belief in the structure of legal systems is as strong (and as 
weak) as our belief in the possibility of discontinuity in the legal 
order. The law may be completely unstructured. But those 
interested in legal discontinuity must disagree, and so ignore this 
structure at their peril. 
199. /d. at 449. 
200. See Erwin N. Griswold, The Demise of the High Court of Parliament in South 
Africa, 66 HARV. L. REV. 864, 865 (1953). 
201. !d. at 866 n.9. 
202. Minister of the Interior v. Harris, 1952 (4) S.A. 769 (A). See also Griswold, supra 
note 200, at 866 (discussing procedural history of the case). 
203. Charles Villa-Vicencio, Whither South Africa? Constitutionalism and Law-
making, 40 EMORY L.J. 141, 152 (1991). 
204. Collins v. Minister of the Interior, 1957 (1) S.A. 552, 566 (A). See also Villa-
Vicencio, supra note 203, at 152. 
